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Chapter - / 
CHAPTER - _I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The Industrial Dispute Act 1947 as enacted initially was 
a piece of legislation mainly concerned with providing machinery 
for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. But 
labour relations convey the sense of all sorts of relationship 
between labour and the management. It comprehends matters of 
securing of earnings and job besides industtial peace, harmony, 
disputes and settlement thereof linked vjlth the security of 
earnings and job are the related concepts of lay-off and ret-
renchment. 
There are myriads of situations and emergencies when 
the labour requirements of an employer diminish temporarily 
or permanently. Under certain circumstances^ an employer may 
find himself unable to provide v/ork to his employees and may 
have to dispense with the services of his employee and rein-
state him when his business or industry was resumed. He was 
perfectly free to dismiss him and employ new men when his 
buslbess or industry was resumed. Sometimes the employer 
choose not to dismiss the employee but to temporarily 
discharge him or to suspend the contract of employment. 
Lay off was the.expression used to denote a situation 
during which an employee was temporarily discharged and no 
remuneration provided. This led to disputes and industrial 
tribunals were concerned with the allocation of risk of unavai-
lability of remuneraive work and at times awarded some compensa-
tion to the laid off employees on ground of social justice and 
2 
equity. 
Retrenchment was understood as discharge of surplus labour 
The conceptual problem with retrenchment is that it is a dis-
missal which is at the same time ostensibly fair (in that the 
employer had no option but to dismiss) and unfair (in that the 
employee has done no wrong), in such situation it was realised 
l.hat in a concept of welfare state, employees must be provided 
with some relief so that the rigour of permanent unemployment, 
can be relieved to a certain extent at the cost of the employer, 
In the old concept of a free society, relation between 
the employer and an employee must be free and the mutual free-
dom was to be exercised through a contract entered into with 
free will of both parties. The principle on which relationship 
of employer and employee was based* was doctrine of Laissiz-
laire and the Governments of the day were guided by this 
principle. But with the growth of economy and society, the 
exercise of free will became precarious for labour,because of 
chronic economic crisis, unemployment and abuhdance of labour. 
Though some progressive employers used to voluntary pay and 
Industrial Tribunal used to award some compensation to workmen 
for "lay-off or retrenchment yet the situation was far from 
satisfactory. 
The situation was precipitated in 1953 where,as a result of 
accumulated stocks in textile industry, textile mills were 
threatened with the consequences of closure of one or more 
shifts entailing lay-off or retrenchment of a large number of 
workers employed in the industry. An agreement regarding the 
payment of compensation for involuntary unemployment, as lay-
off was understood to mean, was arrived at between 
the 'employers' and '- workers' representatives at 
the 13th session of the standing Labour Committee at New 
2 
Delhi •n 27-28 July 1953 and It became Imperative that the 
state must Interfere with its power of legislation and 
execution to protect the rights and interests of labour. 
The President of India promulgated the Industrial 
Dispute (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953, making provision for 
compensation for lay-off and retrenchment, setting a common 
standards for all employers© The ordinance was subsequently 
repealed and replaced by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) 
Act 1953, The definition of'lay-off'and 'retrenchment' was 
also, now provided in the Act, 
The substantial provision for lay-off and retrenchment 
specified in newly Introduced Chapter VA of Act imposed 
heavy liabilities on the employer in the event of his decid-
ing to lay-off or to retrench his workmen. These liabilities 
were Intended to act as deterrents on the employer taking 
recourse to "lay-off" and retrenchment light-heattedly. 
Even with the Introduction of Chapter VA in 1953,there 
were no provisions restricting or preventing lay-off and 
retrenchment. In view of large scale lay-offs and retrench-
ments resorted to by big establishments, the Central and 
State Governments, in order to prevent avoidable hardships 
to the employees and to maintain higher tempo of production 
and productivity felt it necessary to put some restrictions. 
on the employer's r i g h t t o lay -o f f and retrenchment. The Act 
was # there f o r e , .^ erjended by the Indus tr ia l Disputes (Amendment) 
Act , 1976 which engrafts Chapter VB i n t o the Act . The newly 
introduced provis ions put s t r i c t curbs an employer in e f f e c t i -
ng l a y - o f f and retrenchment i n i n d u s t r i a l establ ishment employ-
ing one hundred or more workers. 
THS IROBLEM AND ITg STUDY; 
Sec-2 5C of the Act, making provis ions for payment of 
compensation for lay -o f f , i s app l i cab le only t o i n d u s t r i a l 
es tabl ishments employing f i f t y or more workers. The Bonrtoay 
High court held that t h i s excluded the workmen of smal ler e s t a b -
lishments and they could not claim any compensation in the event 
of t h e i r being ""laid-off? But at the same t «ne the matter was 
being looked at from the aspect of t h e employer's r i g h t to lay-
o f f . While holding that an employer had no inherent r i g h t t o 
l a y - o f f and no such r i g h t i s provided for under the Act , Supreme 
Court s a i d tha t Chapter V A was not a complete code even i f the 
l a y - o f f was without any authority and thus e n t i t l i n g the work-
men t o f u l l wages, and i n d u s t r i a l t r ibuna l could award a l e s s e r 
sum f inding the J u s t i f i a b i l i t y of lay-of fT If the i s s u e i s t o be 
decided upon J u s t i f i a b i l i t y of the "lay-off" the very not ion of 
a s p e c i f i c r i g h t looses s i g n i f i c a n c e . If there i s no r i g h t the 
purported lay -o f f would be i l l e g a l . The problem therefore i s 
"whether the employer has an implied r i g h t to l a y - o f f , " Further, 
there i s no l i m i t a t i o n under the law on the period for which 
l a y - o f f may cont inue . 
A situation may be conceived where an employer Is not 
in a position of early resumption of work, yet he does 
not decide to retrench the workmen. In such a situation 
the workmen continue to face the uncertainty. If any of 
such laid off workmen decides to leave the job, he looses 
the compensation to which he would have been entitled had 
he been retrenched by the employer. What is the remedy to 
a workman, in such a situation? These problems could not 
have been properly answered without a study of the concept 
of lay-off and the provisions for payment of compensation 
for lay-off. 
More than lay-off the concept of retrenchment is 
fraught with confusion and uncertainity. While a five 
judge bench of the Supreme Ctourt categorically said that 
"in no case is there any retrenchment, unless there is 
discharge of surplus labour or staff in a continuing or 
running industry. •• Recently smaller benches of two or 
three judges have put much stress on the otherwise wide 
definition of the expression 'retrenchment', From State 
Bank ruling that "whatever the reason,' every termination 
7 
spells retrenchment© the court through Santosh Gupta, 
8 
clarifying that Hari Prasad was deciding only whether 
termination on closure amounts to retrenchment and that 
reference to surplus was only illustrative and not exhaus-
tive reached Mohan Lai to categorically sayl •* Niceties 
and semantics apart, termination by the employer of the 
service of a workmen for any reason whatsoever would cons-
t i t u t e retrenchment except in cases excepted In the Section 
i t s e l f . Iirtille reading down the wide defini t ion of 'retrenchment* 
to mean what i t ordinari ly meant, in Harl Prasad, case the 
11 
court had examined the scheme of the Act whereas in State Bank, 
12 13 
Santosh Gupta is case and Mohan Lai's casetcourt looked to 
the definition alone. What then is the true concept of retrench-
ment in the scheme of the Act? Besides the study of the 'concept 
of Retrenchment it was necessary to study the requisites of a 
valid retrenchment in order to have a wholesome picture of the 
substantial provisions of law relating to retrenchment. 
The newly introduced Chapter VB of the Act put strict 
curbs on the employer in respect of lay-off and retrenchment. 
The employers of industrial establishment employing one 
hundred or more workmen have been obliged to take permission 
of the authority specified by the appropriate government for 
affecting lay-off and retrenchment. The concept of lay-off 
and retrenchment had evolved to meet emergency situation and 
if strict curbs were put on the employer to resort to lay-off 
and retrenchment that cuts at the roots of the concept Itself, 
What, then is the justification of these curbs? Whether the 
requirement of permission for lay off and retrenchment is a 
reasonable restriction on the employer and constitutionally 
valid? A seperate chapter has been devoted to the study of 
this aspect. 
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CH^P'ISR - I I 
Idy-off i s a well known expression in the f i e l d of employer 
- employee r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In i t s etymological sense, lay-off i s 
a period during which a workman i s temporarily discharged.*^ 
Under the coimion law of employment a lay off i s where,there i s 
no work for the employees and no remuneration provided, i t r e fe r s 
to a s i t u a t i o n of involuntary unemployment or forced unemployment 
i . e . when the contract of employment becomes unpossible of per-
formance under ce r t a in circumstances of stoppage of work caused 
by factors beyond everybody's con t ro l and the operat ion of the 
contract of employment becomes temporari ly suspended."^The expre-
ssion of lay-off incorporates a notion of temporary f r u s t r a t i o n 
of contrac t of employment, 
UntHl 1938 there was no law in India which had any d i r e c t 
or i nd i r ec t bearing on the sub jec t . In 1938 the Government of 
Bonnbay passed the Bombay Indus t r i a l Disputes Act which i n t e r - a l i a 
provided for the framing of Standing Orders by employers. Invo-
luntary unemployment was one of the matters which was t o be cove-
red by the standing o rde r s . In 1946 a Centra l Act, the I n d u s t r i a l 
Employment (Standing orders) Act, was passed which provides for 
framing of standing orders by employers for regu la t ing t he 
condit ions of employment, and fur ther provides t h a t the 
standing orders framed by the employeiTs should, as far as 
poss ib le , be in conformity with the Model Standing Orders. 
Prom the provisions of the Model Standing orders. It Is 
clear that 'lay-off* means involuntary unemployment due to 
fire, catastrophe breakdown of machinery, stoppage of power 
supply, epidemics civil commotion, failure of plant or a 
7 
temporary curtailment of production, and strike affecting 
wholly or partially any section or department of the estab-
8 9 
lishment or other cause beyond the control of the employer. 
The expression 'other cause beyond the control of the employer, 
however does not cover trade reasons like financial difficul-ty. 
The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f l a y - o f f was i n s e r t e d i n 
t h e I n d u s t r i a l D i s p u t e s A c t , 1947 by an amendment i n 1 9 5 3 , 
MEANING OF 'LAM-OFF UNDER'THE ACT; 
To d e n o t e t h e s t a t e o f f o r c e d unemployment some o t h e r 
t e r m s s u c h a s l a y - o f f o r i n v o l u n t a r y unemployment w e r e u s e d 
and l e s t t h e s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s , s h o u l d c a u s e any c o n f u s i o n o r 
c o n f l i c t i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t e r m 
12 
• l a y - o f f , t h e d e f i n i t i o n c l a u s e c l a r i f i e s t h a t t e r m l a y -
o f f i n c l u d e s o t h e r c o n g n a t e e x p r e s s i o n a s w e l l . 
I n S e c t i o n 2 (KKK), l a y - o f f h a s b e e n d e f i n e d a s me a n ing 
o f t h e f a i l u r e , r e f u s a l o r i n a b i l i t y o f an e m p l o y e r on a c c o u n t 
o f s h o r t a g e o f c o a l , power o r raw m a t e r i a l o r t h e a c c u m u l a -
t i o n o f s t o c k s , t h e b reakdown of m a c h i n e r y o r f o r any o t h e r 
r e a s o n t o g i v e employment t o a workmen whose name i s b o r n e 
10 
on the muster rolls of his Industrial establishment arri who 
has not been retrenched. The key to understand the import 
of the definition is to be found in the words•# 'failure, 
refusal or inability of an employer," which makes it clear 
that unemployment has to be on account of a cause which is 
Independent of any action or inaction on the part of workmen 
themselves, as also due to reasons beyond the employer's 
control to give employment to a workman. 
Besides specific causes for lay-off, the definition 
provides that lay-off may also be for "any other reason," 
and this expression has been the subject matter of several 
judicial pronouncements. 
The rule of 'ejusdemgeneris' has been applied in inter-
-^ ^ 15 
preting the expression 'any other reason. In Kairbetta Estate 
Gajendragadkar J. observed that 'any other reason' to which 
the definition refers must be a reason which is allied or 
analogous to the reason already specified. 
In Central India's case a division bench of the Bombay 
High court observed that in using the words 'any other reason' 
it could not have been the intention of the legislature to 
bring within the definition every circumstances possibJe which 
has resulted in unemployment of workers. The court enunciated 
the principle that these words should be limited or restricted 
for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the 
Act, but in its application took the view that if, in point 
of fact, lay-off was occasioned because of strikes or go-slow 
tactics or absenteeism of workers in other sections of the 
11 
mills, on which the particular section in which some workers 
were lald-off;was dependent, then their laying off can not be 
deemed to fall within the definition, 
17 The view of the Bombay High Court ' has been over ruled 
18 
by the Supreme Court in yairbfff-ta Estate where while constr-
uing the words 'any other reason' 'ejusdem generis* the court 
observed that "if there is a strike or slowing down of produc-
tion in one part of the establishment and if 'lay off Is the 
consequence, the reason for which lay-off has taken place would 
undoubtedly be similar to the reasons specified in the defini-
tion. 
Postponement of work due to failure to supply roving 
bobbins to the weaving unit of a textile Mill pending the 
dismantling of preparatory machines at the mill and installa-
tion of the same at such unit and time required for getting 
renewal from the Textile Commissioner on expiry of licence 
are held to reasons ejusdemgeneris with those stated in the 
definition^ 
That lay-off effected because of some natural calamity 
will be covered under the defintion, is now clear from sub-
clause (1) of section 25 M of the Act requiring previous per-
mission of specified authority for lay-off unless such lay-
off is due to shortage of power or to natural calamity. 
12 
The definition clause has an explanation with two 
provisos. The explanation provides that every workman whose 
name is borne on the muster rolls of the establishment and 
who presents himself for work at the establishment at the 
time appointed for the purpose during the normal working 
hours on any day and is not given employment by the employer 
within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed 
to have been la id-off for that day. Does this explalnatlon 
20 
widen the scope of the defintlon? In ghree Meenakshi Mills 
a single judge of the Madras High Court observed that the 
explalnatlon widens the meaning of the definition of the word 
lay-off, and a workman, though there had been no lay-off 
due to reasons stated in the definition, can claim to have 
been laid-off if his name is brone on the muster rolls and 
he presents himself for work and he is not given any employ-
21 
ment. This was supported by a division bench of the same 
High Court, 
It is submitted that the above view is erroneous. The 
explalnatlon does not widen the scope of 'lay-off* which has 
to be for the reasons specified or analogous or allied reasons, 
The true scope and meaning of the explalnatlon, it Is submi-
tted, is expounded by the Bombay High Court in Reckchand Mehta 
22 
Spg and Wvg Mills that this explalnatlon has nothing to do 
with the 'quality of lay-off*. The court further observed 
that without affecting or in any other manner qualifying 
the circumstances in which a lay-off comes about under the 
same defintlon, the explalnatlon purports to raise quantitative 
13 
presumption with regard to the extent of time during which 
lay-off has been effective. 
It is submitted that under the given provision of 
the explaination the intention of the legislature was not to 
widen the scope of the definition but that a workman may not 
be kept waiting for more than two hours and if he is not given 
work, of course for the reasons given in the definition, with-
in two hours of his presenting himself for work he shall be 
deemed to have been laid-off for the whole day without requi-
ring him to wait for work beyond two hourso 
It may, therefore, be said that lay-off occurs when the 
contract of employment becomes incapable of performance i«e. 
when the contract is frustrated for reasons beyond the control 
of the employer and employees. To constitute lay-off, refusal, 
failure or inability of the employer to provide v;ork to any 
workman must be for the reasons specified or those analogous 
to them and not without reference to such reasons, 
WORKMAN WHO CAN BE LAlD-OFF; 
The definition refers only to a workman whose name is 
borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment ^nd 
who has not been retrenched. If a workman has been retrenched, 
obviously the question of his lay-off would not arise, section 




In Management of Sree Meenakshi Mills V Labour Court 
It was opined that reference to muster rolls means muster 
rolls of permanent employeeso Further, there Is no provision 
in the industrial law which requires that a list of 'badli' 
workers should be maintained. In P. Joseph it was observed 
that the definition of 'workman* does not exclude even a 
casual employee or substitute like a 'badli' and there is 
nothing in section 2 (KKK) which would allow by passing of 
the definitiono This poses the question : Can a 'bad1i' 
workman whose name included in the muster rolls, be laid-
off? 
From the definition it would appear that a 'badli 
workman* whose name is not included in the muster rolls 
can not said to be laid off. The case of a badli workman 
assumes significance in view of Sec 25-C which excludes 
a badli workman from the benefit of lay-off compensation 
but by explaination admits him to such benefit on his com-
pLeting one year of continuous service in the establishment, 
PERIOD FOR lAY-oFFt 
The very essence of lay-off is that it is temporary 
stoppage but the law does not lay down any definite period 
25 for lay-off. The court further observed that as to how 
short the lay off should be in any particular case and at 
15 
what point of time the lay-off cases to be proper must 
depend upon the facts of the case. 
The contention that the definition of lay-off as 
given in Sec 2(KKK) has controlled and modified by the 
explaination, and reading the definition with the explain-
ation would show that a lay-off, which would entitle a 
workman to compensation within the meaning of Section 25C, 
can not be for less than one full day or half day was re-
jected by a division bench of the Bombay High C3Durt in 
Reckchand Mehta Spg and Vfvg Mills« 
The explaination to Sec-2(kkk) introduces a fiction 
in the definition and contains three deeming provisions 
with regard to the mode of calculations of the period of 
lay-off. The first is that if a workman who had presented 
himself for work at the commencement was not given employ-
ment within two hourw of his presenting himself, he will be 
deemed to have been laid off for the entire day. The second 
is that if a workman instead of being given employment at 
the commencement for work during the second half of the 
shift and was given employment in the second half, he 
shall be deemed to have been laid off only for first half 
of the day. The third is that if a workman was not given 
work even after presenting himself at the commencement of 
the second half of the shift, he shall be entitled to full 
basic wages and dearness allowance for that second half, 
^ 27 
In Reckchand Mohta Spg and Vfvg M i l l s , t h e c o u r t he ld 
16 
that there is nothing in the definition of lay-off which 
requires the stoppage of work under the conditions specified 
in it for the minimum period of half a day or full day. 
Merely because the explaination makes some deeming provisions 
with regard to treating the lay-off as being effective for a 
full day or a half-day, it can not be said that the law did 
not contemplate a lay-off for less than a half day or for a 
period short of two hours. 
The definition does not state the extent of the period 
of lay-off. It is however, not open to the employer, under 
the cloak of lay-off, to keep his employees in a state of 
suspended animation, and not to make up his mind whether 
the industry or business would ultimately continue or there 
would be a permanent stoppage, and thereby deprive his 
28 
employees of full wages. 
An employee has no remedy against long periods of lay-
29 
off. The situation is not so dismal in U.K. Under the law, 
there employee may claim a redundancy payment where he has 
been laid-off for a period of four consecutive weeks, or 
for a total of six weeks in a thirteen week period, the 
procedure is that he must give written notice to the employer 
of his intention to claim a redundancy payment(corresponding 
to retrenchment compensation under our law) oy virtue of 
the lay-off (within four weeks of the end of either of the 
specified periods) and must terminate his employment by 
giving the amount of notice required of him under the contract. 
17 
The e m p l o y e r may c o n t e s t t h e c l a i m by g i v i n g t h e e m p l o y e e a 
w r i t t e n c o u n t e r - n o t i c e w i t h i n s e v e n d a y s o f r e c e i v i n g t h e 
e m p l o y e e s n o t i c e and by s e e k i n g t o show t h a t I t couJd r e a s o n -
a b l y b e e x p e c t e d ( a t t h e d a t e o f employeefe n o t i c e ) t h a t w i t h i n 
f o u r w e e k s t h e employee wou ld e n t e r a p e r i o d o f a t l e a s t 
t h i r t e e n w e e k s w i t h o u t any l a y - o f f , t h i s q u e s t i o n I s t h e n 
d e c i d e d by t h e I n d u s t r i a l T r i b u n a l , 
Under o u r l a w , t h o u g h an e m p l o y e r h a s a r i g h t t o r e t r e n c h 
a workman a f t e r f o r t y f i v e d a y s o f l a y - o f f and a d j u s t t h e l a y -
o f f c o m p e n s a t i o n t o w a r d s r e t r e n c h m e n t c o m p e n s a t i o n , t h e r e i s 
no c o r r e s p o n d i n g r i g h t i n t h e workman t o c l a i m r e t r e n c h m e n t 
i f t h e l a y - o f f c o n t i n u e s f o r a l o n g p e r i o d and t h e e m p l o y e r 
c o n t i n u e s t o p u t o f f t h e d e c i s i o n t o c o n t i n u e t h e l a y - o f f 
o r r e t r e n c h t h e workmen. Though i t i s n o t open t o t h e e m p l o y e r , 
a l t h o u g h h e knows t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t s u c h t h a t i t 
i s p o s s i b l e t o r e sume work o r t h e b u s i n e s s , j u s t t o p o s t p o n e 
coming t o a c o n c l u s i o n and t o p u t o f f t h e e v i l day by c o n t i -
n u i n g t h e l a y - o f f . a n d n o t r e t r e n c h . The workman who h a v e b e e n 
3 1 l a i d o f f and whose ^ r v i o e s w i l l n o l o n g e r be r e q u i r e d , workmen 
h a v e t h e o n l y remedy o f r a i s i n g an i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e i n s u c h 
a s i t u a t i o n . A p r o v i s i o n , i t i s f e l t , s i m i l a r t o t h e o n e i n 
U.K. w i l l a m e l i o r a t e t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
LAY OFF EFFECT ON EMPLOYER EMPLOxEE HEIATIONSHIP: 
L a y - o f f h a s b e e n c a l l e d a t e m p o r a r y d i s c h a r g e o f t h e 
32 
workman o r a t e m p o r a r y s u s p e n s i o n o f h i s c o n t r a c t o f s e r v i c e . 
18 
s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , i t i s not s o . I t i s merely a f a c t o f 
temporary unemployment of t h e workmen i n t h e work o f the Ij idus-
33 t r i a l E s t a b l i s h m e n t . 
l a y - o f f does not t e r m i n a t e or b r i n g t o an end the c o n -
34 t r a c t of employment, 
ADJUDICATION OF lAY-QFF | 
In Tatanaqer Foundry the Supreme Court laid down t h a t i n 
d e a l i n g w i t h " l a y - o f f * i t would not be open t o the T r i b u n a l t o 
i n q u i r e whether the employer c o u l d have avo ided "lay-off** i f he 
had been more d i l i g e n t , c a r e f u l or f a r s i g h t e d . That i s a matter 
r e l a t i n g t o t h e management of t h e undertak ing and u n l e s s malaf ides 
are a l l e g e d or proved, t h e Tr ibuna l c a n have no J u r i s d i c t i o n t o 
s i t i n judgement over t h e a c t s of t h e management o f t h e employer 
and i n v e s t i g a t e whether a more prudent management c o u l d have 
avo ided t h e s i t u a t i o n which l e d t o a l a y - o f f , 
MAIAFirB IAY-OFF> 
If the employer has d e l i b e r a t e l y and mal ic ious ly brought 
about a s i t u a t i o n where 'lay^-off' becomes necessary, then i t 
would be ma la - f ide l ay -o f f and would not be a l ay -o f f which i s 
j u s t i f i e d und^ Sec-2 (kkk) of the Act . Malafides of the employer 
in declaring a l ay -o f f r e a l l y means that no l a y - o f f i n terms of 
Sec 2 (kkk) has in law taken p l a c e . l ikewise,when a l ay -o f f has 
been declared in order t o v i c t i m i s e the workmen or for some other 
u l t e r i o r purpose,the a c t i o n taken i a not a l ay -o f f <is contemplated 
by Sec 2 (kkk) of the Act . A r e t a l i a t o r y or v i n d i c t i v e lay-
off i s not covered under Sec 2 (kkk)?^ 
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CHAPTSB - i n 
BMPLOYBR'S RIGHT TO lAY-OFF 
The ent i t lement of theSnployer t o suspend employment by 
reason of unava i lab i l i t y of work ( i . e . to lay-of f t h e employeej 
i s a s p e c i a l aspect of the general quest ion :What i s t h e extent 
of employer's o b l i g a t i o n t o provide work. 
The general ru le a t comtnon law i s that an employer must 
2 pay the wages of a l l employees i f they are a v a i l a b l e for work. 
The Conmon law r u l e , however, can be varied by an express or 
implied term to the contrary. Thus/ i f the contract • t a t e s that 
there s h a l l be no payment during a l ay -o f f the employers w i l l 
3 incur no ob l iga t ion t o pay. 
Contract of emplciyment n e c e s s a r i l y imposes upon the employ-
er some degree of o b l i g a t i o n to maintain the employment r e l a t i o -
4 
nsh ip . An employer has no inherent r i g h t t o l a y - o f f workers as 
he c h o o s e s . In the absence of an express r ight t o do s o in the 
contrac t , such u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n can be regarded as a repudia-
t i o n of the c o n t r a c t . 
Under Common Law, n ine t t en century cases although recogni -
sed t h a t the employer n e c e s s a r i l y comes under some kind of o b l i -
ga t ion t o provide work s o t h a t Remuneration may be earned,never-
t h e l e s s recognised that a wide prerogat ive t o suspend employ-
ment could properly be impl ied, and that the e x i s t e n c e of a 
%i.de power of suspension was not repugnant t o the concept 
23 
of binding contract of employment. The cases even recognised 
the entitlement of employer to feduce or suspend work during 
7 
time of t rade depression. Re-Najley, Re C o l l i e r indicated a 
r i g h t on the par t of the employer a temporary shut down of the 
mine, perhaps by v i r t u e merely of the bad t rad ing condit ions« 
8 
An opinion of the same kind was expressed in whit^ t^-io v Pi-^nViAnH, 
These formulae c lea r ly allowed for lay-off by reason of 9 
slackness of t r a d e . 
The implied r i g h t of the employer to lay the employee off 
was great ly limited by decision of the Court of Appeal in Devona-
Id V Rosser and Sons, Although a custom of suspension in the 
events of breakage of machinery r epa i r s and shortage of water 
or coal was a va l id term of the con t rac t of employment never-
the less an a l leged custorr, whereby the employers were e n t i t l e d 
to suspend for want of remunerative orders for t h e i r products 
cu.ould not form par t of the con t rac t , because i t was not reason-
able and would c rea te an unacceptable element of uncer ta inty 
in the c o n t r a c t . 
The Coinnon law of emplcyment presumed in favour of an 
obl iga t ion on the par t of the employer t o provide a piece r a t e 
worker with su f f i c i en t work to enable him to earn a reasonable 
rajfce of remuneration, t ha t i s to say a r a t e of remunerative 
bearing a reasonable r e l a t i o n s h i p to his earnings when work i s 
fully a v a i l a b l e . But the coimion law a l s o allowed the employer 
wide powers of imposing periods of lay-off in the event of un-
a v a i l a b i l i t y of work due to circumstances beyond his c o n t r o l ^ 
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Under the Conunon Law, an employer could terminate the 
se rv ices of an employee a t any time though h i s bus iness o r 
Industry may only be temporarily stopped and there was 
every prospect to resumption of t h a t business or i ndus t ry . 
There was no ob l iga t ion upon the employer temporari ly t o 
suspend the se rv ices of h i s employer and r e i n s t a t e him when 
13 h i s bus iness or industry was resumed. But, the employer 's 
r i g h t t o suspend employment for c e r t a i n reasons , beyond h i s 
con t ro l and without payment of wages which i s essence of lay-
off , was impliedly read in to the con t rac t s of employment. 
In Ind ia , the express provision for lay-off could be 
found in the Standing Orders framed by i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h -
ments covered by Bombay Indus t r i a l Dispute Act, 1938 and 
l a t e r by I n d u s t r i a l Employment (Standing Orders) Act , 1946. 
The prov is ions of the l a t t e r Act apply to i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b -
l ishment employing one hundred or more workmen. Such indus -
t r i a l es tabl ishment are required to frame t h e i r own Standing 
orders for which s h a l l be , so far as i s p r a c t i c a b l e / i n con-
formity with the Model Standing Orders, 
The cour t s in India have been d i r e c t l y faced with t h e 
i s sue of employee's r i g h t regarding lay-off in the context 
of i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishments employing l e s s than 50 workmen 
t o whom the provis ions of the Act for payment of compensa-
t i o n for lay-of f do not apply. This i s sue assumed Importance 
25 
because if the employer had an implied r i g h t to lay-off 
then even in t t e absence of express p rov i s ions for the 
same, lay-off for reasons given in Sec-2 (kkk) would be 
proper otherwise i l l e g a l and without any r i g h t in which 
case employees would be e n t i t l e d to fu l l wages for the 
period of such unauthorised lay-off . This i s a lso the 
s i t u a t i o n in case of i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishment employing 
more than 50 but l e s s than 100 workmen because the Indus-
t r i a l Employment (Standing o rders ) Act 1946 does not apply 
t o them and such i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishment may a l s o not 
have any spec i f i c p rovis ions for l ay-of f in t h e i r con t r ac t s 
of employment, 
A d i v i s i o n bench of the Bombay High Court was f i r s t 
faced wi th t h i s i s sue in M.A, ve i rya c a s e . The cour t held 
tha t the lay ing-of f of an employee ins tead of being a r i gh t 
was meant to be an ob l iga t ion under the Act, CSiagla C.J, 
observed t h a t the Common Law r i g h t of t he employer to t e r -
minate the se rv ices of h i s employees i s c u r t a i l e d and l i m i -
ted i f he i s bound to lay-off h i s employee, under c e r t a i n 
c i rcumstances . Instead of being free t o d i spense with h i s 
s e r v i c e s , i f t h e r e i s a temporary breakdown and the condi -
t i o n s l a id down in the Act p r e v a i l , an employer can not 
put an end t o the con t r ac t between himself and h i s employee, 
but a l l t h a t he can do i s to suspend the con t r ac t for the 
time being and the employee i s e n t i t l e d to resume h i s 
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se rv ices as soon as tha t temporary stoppage has come to an 
end. This view was turned down by Supreme Court in F i res tone 
14 
Tyre and Rubber Co, 
I t i s submitted t h a t i t would not be c o r r e c t t o say 
tha t when condi t ions l a id down in the Act p r e v a i l , an emp-
loyer can not put an end to the con t rac t of employment but 
only suspend the con t rac t for the time being i . e . lay-off 
the workmen. The reasoning of the Bombay High Oourt i s 
apparently aga ins t the sec 2-(kkk) i t s e l f which def ines 
lay-off t o mean " fa i lu re to give employment to a workman 
who has not been r e t r enched , " c l e a r l y i nd i ca t i ng t h a t for 
the reasons speci f ied in the s e c t i o n , the employer could not 
re t rench the workman but i f the xvorkman has not been r e t -
renched, then unemployment for those reasons c o n s t i t u t e s 
l ay-of f . Supreme Oourt r i g h t l y r e j e c t e d the view t h a t l a y -
off i s an ob l i ga t i on on the employer. The i s sue then i s : 
whether t he employer has an inherent r i g h t to lay-off or 
r i gh t to lay-off i s implied in the p rov is ions and scheme 
of the Act? 
In Dewan Tea E s t a t e , the Supreme Oourt held t h a t 
Section 25-C of the Act providing for payment of compensa-
t ion for lay-off did not recognise any Common Law r i g h t 
of the i n d u s t r i a l employer to lay-off h is workmen. The 
Oourt fu r ther held t h a t Sec 2-(kkk) i s not a pa r t of the 
ope ra t ive provis ions of the Act, The Oourt did not read 
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the r i g h t to lay-off in the d e f i n i t i o n as i t i s c l e a r 
from i t s observation t h a t " i f there had been a provis ion 
in the Act spec i f i ca l l y providing t h a t an employer would 
be e n t i t l e d to lay-off h is workmen for the reasons p r e s -
cribed by Sec-2(kkk), i t might have been another m a t t e r . " 
17 In Fires tone ca se . Supreme court observed t h a t t h e r e 
was no provision in the Act conferr ing power on the employer 
t o lay-off although Sec 2 5 Bsuggested so . 
According t o these obseirvations, the Act does not 
recognise any Common Law r i g h t of an employer to lay-of f 
h i s workman or any inherent r i g h t of the employer t o dec la re 
lay-off for reasons speci f ied in the d e f i n i t i o n . According 
to t h e i r lo rdsh ip of the Supreme c o u r t , an i n d u s t r i a l 
employer has no r igh t to lay-off h i s workmen i f such r i gh t 
i s not provided for by any s t a t u t o r y provis ion or Standing 
Orders or the cont rac t of se rv ice between the employer and 
employees. 
The view of Supreme Court c a l l s for a serious sc ru t iny 
p a r t i c u l a r l y so when the Common Law i t s e l f had recognised 
the implied r i g h t of the employer to lay-off h i s employees 
in c e r t a i n circumstances beyond h i s c o n t r o l . 
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Under given circumstances (those given in Sec 2. (kkk) 
two options were open to the employer He couJd either 
lay-off his employee and when the crisis passed and the 
emergency ceased to exist, he had to reinstate him or he 
18 
could dismiss him. If the right to lay-off is not. read 
either impliedly into the contract of employment or the 
scheme of the Act, the employer is left with the only 
option of terminating the services of his employee. From 
the point of view of the employee the importance of not 
being dismissed but merely laid off can be Understood and 
appriciatedo He may or may not find new work if his servi-
ces are dispensed with. Even when he finds new work the 
number of years that he has already put in service with 
his old employer would be throwq away and whatever benefits 
might have accrued to him by continuing if service would 
19 
also be last to him. 
While promulgating the industrial Dispute (Amendment) 
20 
ordinance No, 5 of 1953 the Government press Communique 
provided "They (Govt,) earnestly hope that in the event 
of employers being forced to curtail production, they 
would explore all possibilities of temporarily lay-off 
workers in preference to retrenching them," The ordinance 
later replaced by Industrial Disputes (Ameddment) Act,1953, 
29 
making provision for compensation for lay-off and retrench-
ment, setting a common standard for all employers, was 
promulgated to avoid industrial unrest in the country when 
in 1953 as a result of accumulated stocks in textile indus-
try, textile mills were threatened with the consequence of 
closure of one or more shifts entailing lay-off or retrench-
ment of a large number of workers employed in the industry. 
Under the civil law there was no legal liability on 
the employers to pay compensation for involuntary unemploy-
ment when the contract between employer an3 employee became 
impossible of performance, but for the sake of peace in 
industry^ the Industrial Tribunals held, even prior to the 
amending Act, that the employer should bear some burden of 
21 
unemployment insurance. The Tribunals did not decide the 
question of unemployment compensation on the basis of 
terms of contract between the parties. In a dispute for 
compensation for lay-off period, in Firestone Tyre and 
22 Rubber Oo, Industrial Tribunal Bombay held - "in this 
dispute it is not necessary to decide this question on 
the basis of what were the terms of the contract between 
the parties. On the point, as in this company there are 
no Standing Orders in existence and no Standing Orders 
have been settled under the Industrial Employment (standing 
orders)Act 1946, Therefore, the demand of the workmen for 
30 
unemployment compensation during the per iod of lay-off 
i s j u s t i f i e d on grounds of equi ty and s o c i a l j u s t i c e . 
Here the employers had resor ted t o l ay-of f of the workmen 
for n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of supply of cord f a b r i c , a raw mate-
r i a l e s s e n t i a l for the manufacturing of t y r e s . In such 
circumstances power to lay-off was implied in to the con t -
23 
r a c t of employment. In Pannalal Bin j ra j Oil Mil ls the 
company had t o lay-off some of i t s workmen on account of 
accumulation of f inished produc ts . The company had no 
Standing Orders in t h i s regard . Yet the Tribunal did not 
find t h a t the laying off was without any r igh t and procee-
ded t o examine and award compensation to the workmen on 
p r i n c i p l e s of equity and s o c i a l j u s t i c e for the sake of 
maintaining peace in the i n d u s t r y . 
We have thus seen t h a t even in India employers r i g h t 
t o l ay-of f was considered impliedly in the con t rac t of 
employment and such lay-of f was to be for the reasons 
beyond t h e con t ro l of the- employers and s i m i l a r t o those 
now spec i f i ed in Sec-2 (kkk) . 
24 In F i res tone Tyre and Rubber CX>, Supreme c o u r t , 
observed t h a t "mere r e fusa l or i n a b i l i t y t o give employment 
to the workmen when he r e p o r t s for duty on one or more 
grounds mentioned in c lause (kkk) o t Sect ion 2 is not a 
teraporairy discharge of the workman, such a power, t h e r e f o r e , 
must be found out from the terms of con t r ac t of s e rv i ce s 
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or t he Standing Orders governing the es tabl i shment" . On 
fac t s* the lay-off was fourri without any au thor i ty of law 
or the power in the management under the con t r ac t of s e r v i c e , 
ye t on the Tr ibuna l ' s f inding t h a t lay-off was j u s t i f i e d as 
i t was promoted by shor t supply of t y r e s t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f f i ce where lay-off was done. Supreme Court awarded 75% of 
the wages to the l a id off workmen and not: fu l l wages even 
though the lay-off was held to be without any a u t h o r i t y . The 
cour t sa id t h a t Chapter v-A of the Act was not a complete 
code and in i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishments to which the provis ions 
of Chapter VA do not apply and t he r e i s no power in the 
employer to lay-off "o rd ina r i ly and genera l ly the workmen 
would be e n t i t l e d to t h e i r fu l l wages but in a reference 
made under Section 10(1) of the Act , i t i s open to the 
Tribunal or the Court t o award a l e s s e r sum finding the 
j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of lay-off ,"^^ 
If the cour t was giving too much s t r e s s on t h e express 
r i g h t t o lay-off the l o g i c a l inference would be t h a t i f the 
employer had a r igh t to lay-off» workmen were not e n t i t l e d 
tio any wages and i f the employer had no r i g h t t o lay-off • 
workmen were e n t i t l e d t o f u l l wages, in i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b -
lishment not covered by Chapter—VA of the Act, But t h i s 
was not so . The Court envisaged two d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s out 
of t he same s i t u a t i o n depending upon whether i t was a case 
upon reference under Sec 10(1) or an app l i ca t i on under 
s e c , 33 C(2) of the Act , 
32 
In coming to the conclusion, the court observed, 
"In a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act it is 
open to the Tribunal or the court to award compensation 
which may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages 
and dearness allowance. But no such power exists in the 
Labour Court unader Section 33-C(2) of the Act, Only the 
money due has got to be quantified. If the lay-off could 
be held to be in accordance with the terms of the contract 
of service, no compensation at all could be allowed under 
Sec 33~C(2) of the Act, while in reference some compensa-
26 
tion could be allowed. " 
It is not easily acceptable that law would conceive 
two different results from a single situation. If Chapter 
V A of the Act is not a complete code the question of 
payment of compensation for the laid off period would be 
determined according to the principles governing prior to 
the introduction of Chapter VA of the Act and that can be 
done properly on adjudication of the justifiability of 
lay-off and other surrounding circumstances. Such an enquiry 
is outside the purview of Sec. 33-C(2) of the Act, The 
anomaly results from looking It as an issue of right or 
no right to lay-off in which case an application under 
Sec 33-c(2) of the Act Is maintainable and the Labour Court 
has to qualify the amount payable to be either none or 
equal to full wages as the case may be. 
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T h a t t h e emp loye r h a s an i m p l i e d p o w e r / l a y - o f f c a n now 
b e s e e n from the p r o v i s i o n s o f C h a p t e r - v B o f t h e A c t . Sec 
25 M o f t h e Act p r o h i b i t s l a y - o f f u n d e r c e r t a i n c l r c u s m t a n c e s 
w h i c h l e a d s t o t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r i g h t t o r e s o r t 
t o l a y - o f f h a s b e e n r e c o g n i s e d by d e f i n i n g t h e c i r c u n B t a n c e s 
u n d e r w h i c h a l a y of £ i s t o b e r e g a r d e d a s i l l e g a l . 
I t i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t w h i l e i t wou ld b e c o r r e c t t o say 
t h a t l a y i n g o f f i s n o t an o b l i g a t i o n on t h e e m p l o y e r a s h e 
i s s t i l l f r e e t o d i s p e n s e w i t h the s e r v i c e s o f h i s e m p l o y e e s 
i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s when h e i s u n a b l e t o p r o v i d e them work even 
f o r r e a s o n s g i v e n i n S e c 2 ( k k k ) o f t h e A c t , i t w i l l a l s o b e 
c o r r e c t t o s a y t h a t an e m p l o y e r h a s i m p l i e d power t o l a y - o f f 
u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o The o b s e r v a t i o n s o f a d i v i s i o n 
27 b e n c h o f Bombay High C o u r t i n C a s t o p h e n e M a n u f a c u n n g Co, 
a r e o p p o s i t e i n t h i s r e g a r d . 
The c o u r t o b s e r v e d : 
"The d e f i n i t i o n o f l a y - o f f i n Sec 2 ( k k k ) s u g g e s t s 
^nd i m p l i e s t h a t an i n d u s t r i a l e m p l o y e r who s u f f e r s 
from s h o r t a g e o f c o a l , power o r raw m a t e r i a l s o r 
r aw m a t e r i a l s o r a c c u m u l a t i o n o f s t o c k s o r b r e a k -
down o f machlneiry o r f o r any o t h e r r e a s o n may s u s -
pend employment o f hJs workmen. T h a t s u s p e n s i o n i s 
d e f i n e d t o be l a y - o f f . The c o n c e p t o f l a y - o f f a r i s e s 
o n l y b e c a u s e t h e u n q u e s t i o n e d g e n e r a l r i g h t o f t h e 
e m p l o y e r t o p u t an end to t h e s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t h a s 
b e e n a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y wiped o f f by r e a s o n u p t h e 
r e l e v a n t l e g i s l a t i o n . The T r i b u n a l s l e a d i n g w i t h 
l a b o u r d i s p u t e s h a v e r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n 
a b n o r m a l b u t i m p o r t a n t s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e I t i s n o t 
p o s s i b l e fo r t h e e m p l o y e r t o g i v e e m p l o y e e s any work 
o f any k i n d . T h e s e a r e t h e s i t u a t i o n s m e n t i o n e d i n 
t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f l a y - o f f i n Sec 2 ( k k k ) , " 
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To ta lk of employer's express r ight to lay-off 
i s also mil i tant to the concept that lay-off occurs 
when there i s temporary frxjstration of the contract 
of employment. I t i s suggested that to clar i fy the 
issue© leg i s la t ive amendment is necessary par t i cu la r -
ly when the Supreme Court has said that power to lay-
off must be found expressly in the contract of service 
or the Standing Orders, 
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CHAPTER - I V 
COMPENSATION FOR LAY-OFF 
Introductory 
Under the Civil law* there was no legal liability 
on the employers to pay compensation for involuntary unemploy-
ment# When the contract between the employer and employee be-
came Impossible of performance. But this was not sufficient to 
dispose of the Industrial dispute concerning lay-off. Security 
2 
of income i s a matter of great moment to an Industr ia l worker. 
I t was recognized that Industrial law was wider In i t s scope 
and operation than contract law and was based on s o c i a l J u s t i c e 
and equi ty and was concerned with peace and cordial r e l a t i o n s 
3 
between management and labour industry. Undoubted inequa l i ty 
in the capaci ty of employers and employees to bear the misfor-
tunes of adverse circumstances J u s t i f i e d the payment of some 
compensation to the workers as a matter of soc ia l J u s t i c e to 
enable them to t i d e over the d i f f i c u l t period and be f i t and 
4 
ready when work Is resumed. Payment of compensation to the 
workmen for the l a y - o f f period was regarded as unemployment 
insurance. Even prior t o the introduction of s ta tutory provi -
s ions for payment of l a y - o f f compensation, industr ia l t r ibuna l s 
38 
had by and large* admitted the r ight of workmen t o claim 
l a y - o f f compensation for the sake of peace in industry 
and on p r i n c i p l e s Of soc ia l J u s t i c e and equi ty . Tliese 
dec i s ions of the industr ia l tr ibunals* however* lacked 
uniformity both as regards the quantum of compensation 
and the circumstances in which i t should be pa id . Though 
compensation was being given by a l l progress ive ©nplpyers 
i t was f e l t that a common standard should be s e t for a l l 
the employers and the r ight of compensation to 1 a id -o f f 
workmen was f i r s t s t a t u t o r i l y recognized with the i n t r o -
duction of Chapter V A into the Act in 1953. 
The substant ia l prov i s ions for payment of 
compensation and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n for the same are cont-
ained in Ss. 25C and 25E. Sub. Sec (6) of Sec-25M makes 
Sec-25c (excepting second proviso) appl icable to indus tr ia l 
es tabl i shments t o which Sec-25 M app l i e s and the explaina-
t ion to Seo-25 M corresponds to sub-c lause (i) of Sec-25E 
When iiK>rkmen are not e n t i t l e d to compensation. The prov i s ions 
of Chapter VA of the Act are* however* not exhaust ive as 
i t i s not a complete code and compensation could be awarded 
in cases not covered by Chapter V A of the Act. 
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Entitlement and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of %»orkn>en l a i d k o f f for 
Oompensatlon t 
Laying-off a troikman Is an act ion of the 
employer. I t r e s u l t s In depriving the la ldkof f workaen 
Q 
Of the opportunity to work and earn wages. T*ie employer 
ls# therefore^ required to pay compensation t o the workman 
who Is l a ld -o f f# If the workman's case f a l l s within the 
q 
prov i s ions of Sec-25c of the Act# whlrti e n t i t l e s a work-
man t o l a y - o f f compensation equivalent to f i f t y per cent 
of the t o t a l of the bas i c wages and dearness allowance 
for the period of h i s l a y - o f f except for the Intervening 
weekly ho l idays . 
QualI f i cat lons 
In order to be e n t i t l e d to l a y - o f f compensa-
t ion a workman should s a t i s f y the fo l lowing cond i t ions : 
1) His name should be borne on the muster r o l l s of the 
indus tr ia l establishment and he should not have been 
retrenched. 
11)He should not be a *badll workman* or a casual workman 
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except that a badO. 1 workman^ would be q u a l i f i e d 
to rece ive the benef i t of compensation i f he s a t l ^ 
sfiedl the requirements s tated in the Explainatlon 
appended to the Sect ion. 
i l i ) H e should have completed not l e s s than one year of 
continuous serv ice under the employer. 
Pi squal i f i c a t i o n s 
The main provis ion for payment of l a y - o f f 
compensation i s contained in Sec-25c. Ihe prov i s ion of 
Seo-25E carve out an exception to the general prov i s ions 
for payment of l a y - o f f compensation. Sec-25E enumerates 
the circumstances which d i s e n t i t l e a workman to l a y - o f f 
compensation. These circumstances are t 
1) Refusal by the workman to accept a l t e r n a t i v e croployroentt 
Refusal of the workman to accept an a l t e r n a t i v e 
employment of fered to him by the employer w i l l d i s -
e n t i t l e him to claim l a y - o f f compensation i f such a l t e r -
na t ive employment i s « -
(a) In the same establishment from which he has been l a i d - o f f 
for . 
(b) In any other establishment belonging t o the same anployer 
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s i t u a t e d In the same town o i v i l l a g e or s i t u a t e d 
within a radius of f i v e mi l e s from the e s t a b l i s h -
ment to which he belongs, 
(e) in the opinion of the employer the a l t e r n a t i v e 
employment does not ca l l for any specia l s k i l l or 
previous experience and can be done by the l a i d -
of f workman and 
(d) i t c a r r i e s the same wages v^ich would normally have 
been paid to the workman in h i s or ig inal employment* 
i i ) Absence from the establishment at the appointed time: 
A duty i s c a s t upon the I a i d - o f f workman to presen 
himsel f for work at the establ ishment from which he has 
been l a l d - o f f at the appointed time during normal working 
hours at l e a s t once a day during the period of l a y - o f f / 
before he can be e n t i t l e d to l a y - o f f compensation. I t 
absolves the employer from h i s l i a b i l i t y to pay l a y - o f f 
compensation in case the 1 a i d - o f f workman commits de fau l t 
12 in so present ing himsel f . 
i i i ) Lay-off occasioned by a s t r i k e or go-s low t 
The in tent ion of the l e g i s l a t u r e appears to 
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be to abso lve the employee from the o b l i g a t i o n t o pay 
compensation where the l a y - o f f Is occasioned by a s t r i k e 
or slowing down of production in another part of that 
establ ishment . An employer of the establishment covered 
by Chapter VB of the Act# however i s not so absolved. 
A s t i k e on the part of the workman i s another 
part of the establishment i s thus made a J u s t i f i a b l e 
reason for exonerating the employer from l i a b i l i t y to 
14 l a y - o f f compensation. 
I h i s c lause t r e a t s workmen in one e s t a b l i s h -
ment as one c l a s s and a s t r i k e or slow-down by some r e s u l -
t ing in the l ay ing -o f f of other workmen d i s q u a l i f i e s the 
workmen l a i d - o f f from claiming compensation^ the reason 
IS being that the unemployment i s not r e a l l y involuntary. 
This d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s a t t rac ted i f the 
s t r i k e Or slow-dotm of production i s on the part of work-
men In another part of the establ ishment. When can two 
u n i t s be sa id t o be Parts of the same establ ishment has 
to be decided on the f a c t s of each case . 
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In Agsoctated Cement Oompanlea Supreme court 
appl ied the t e s t of unity of purpose and functional I n t e g r i t y 
While holding that the quarry was a part of the factory . In 
d e a l i n g with the problem, several factors are re levant , but 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the several fac tors would not be the 
17 
same In each case, nor t h e i r Importance. I t Is not enough 
to mention that among the many t e s t s that have been evolved, 
funct ional I n t e g r a l i t y , Inter-dependence or community of 
f inanc ia l control and management, community of man power and 
of I t s c o n t r o l , recruitment and d i s c i p l i n e , the manner In 
which the employer has organised the d i f f erent a c t i v i t i e s , 
whether he has treated them as Independent of one another 
or as Inter connected and inter-dependent, enjoy p lace of 
18 pr ide , but t h i s l i s t Is by no means exhaust ive . In order 
to f ind whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t functional i n t e g r a l i t y 
between the concerns, which may be separate e n t i t l e s , i t i s 
necessary to take an overa l l p i c t u r e of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s 
and the i n t e r e s t i f any, which they have in common.^ 
compensation for l a y - o f f not to be confined to f i r s t 45 days 
F i r s t proviso to Sec-25C provides that i f 
during any period of twelve months, a worman i s 1a id -o f f 
for more than for ty f i v e days, no ccmpensation shal l be 
payable in respect of any period of the l a y - o f f a f ter the 
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expiry of the f i r s t forty f i v e days. If there I s an agree-
ment to that e f f e c t between the workman and the employer. 
The object of t h i s proviso Is to make prov i s ion 
that l a y - o f f conqpensatlon should became payable for a l l the 
days of l a y - o f f beyond the f i r s t f o r t y - f l v e days# un le s s of 
course there Is an agreement to the contrary. 
E>nployer*s r ight to retrench a workman a f t er 45 days of 
lay-off t 
Second proviso to sec -25c e n t i t l e s an employer 
to retrench any workman If the l a y - o f f was to continue for 
more than forty f i v e days In a period of twelve months. 
In case the employer e x e r c i s e s h i s r ight to retrench a 
workman he i s bound to comply with the condi t ions of s e o 2 5 P 
i . e . "conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman". In 
case of such retenchment# the employer has been enabled to 
s e t off the l a y - o f f compensation paid by him to the workmen 
so retrenched during the l a s t twelve months aga ins t the 
20 
compensation payable to h in on retrendiroent. However* 
the r ight to such s e t - o f f i s a v a i l a b l e to the employer only 
in cases of retrenchment as contemplated by Sec-2(00)and 
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not on termination by any other mode, say on c losure . 
Tarmination of s erv ice on c losure i s not retrenchment 
e f f e c t e d in accordance with Sec-25P. By l ega l f i c t i o n 
i t i s treated l i k e retrenchment only for n o t i c e and 
21 the amount of compensation. 
Case of a *badli workman* i 
Under Seo-25C a 'bad l i workman* i s not 
e n t i t l e d to l a y - o f f compensation but Explaination to 
that s e c t i o n s t i p u l a t e s that an completion of one year 
continuous serv ice* a *badli workman' sha l l cease to 
be so for the purposes of l a y - o f f compensation, 
A *badli workman' i s one who i s employed 
general ly in the p lace of a permanent operat ive during 
22 h i s absence. He has no r ight to expect employment 
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everyday, Ihe Explaination to See-25c a l s o provides 
that a 'bad l i workman* means a workman who i s employed 
in an industr ia l establishment in the p l a c e of another 
whose name i s borne on the muster r o l l s of the e s t a b l i -
shment. Prom t h i s i t appears that reference to muster 
24 
r o l l s means muster ro l l of permanent employers. 
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25 In Vljay Kuraar Mi l l s I t was held that a 
workman %«orlcman* should not be one whose name Is found in 
the muster r o l l s and what decides the right to l a y - o f f 
compensation to a *badli workman* i s the e f f e c t of h i s 
name being found in the muster ro l l and not has he i s 
descr ibed there in . This ignores the very nature of the 
employment of a 'badl i workman*, 
The above rul ing f inds support in a d i v i s i o n 
bench rul ing of the same courts where the court proceeded 
on the bas i s that Explainatlon to Sec-2 (kkk) widened i t s 
27 scope which has shown to be erroneous view. A l a y - o f f 
cannot be sa id to have taken p lace without any reference 
to the causes s p e c i f i e d in Sec-2 (kkk). 
I t woiild not be correct to say that the r ight 
to l a y - o f f compensation t o a *badll workman* i s determined 
by the e f f e c t of h i s name being found in tiie muster r o l l s 
and who i s not given work within two hours of h i s presen-
t i n g himself for work at the establishment i f he has comp-
l e t e d one y e a r ' s continuous employment under the employer. 
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Non a v a i l a b i l i t y of *badli workman* cannot 
23 be construed as refusal by the employer to him and 
would not amount to l a y - o f f as n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of work 
to a 'badl i workman* i s not on account of reas^is given 
in Sec-2 (kkk) but because no permanent tiorkman i s absent 
and hence there i s no 'badl i work*. I t i s submitted that 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of h i s name in the muster r o l l s * a *badli 
workman* cannot be deemed to have been 1 a id -o f f simply i f 
no work i s provided to him without any reference to the 
reasons given in Sec-2 (kkk). 
I t i s i m p l i c i t in the d e f i n i t i o n of Lay-of f 
that the workman must have a r ight to ge t work or the 
employment on the day in quest ion and he must have been 
refused eraployment on that day for any of the reasons 
f a l l i n g under Sec-2 (kkk). itterefore* i f a *badli workman* 
i s not able to ge t employment on a p a r t i c u l a r day because 
no Permanent workman or a probationer was absent on that 
day# i t could not be said to be a case of l a y - o f f of that 
*badli workman* and consequently no quest ion of l a y - o f f 
compensation would be involved. 
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Ihe above view was fol lowed in Management 
29 30 
of Sree Mftenalcshi Mlll3# and Sr i Meenakshi Mills- . But 
P. Joseph dissented from t h i s view and held that the 
d e f i n i t i o n of 'workman* does not exclude even a casual 
employee or s u b s t i t u t e l i k e a 'badl i* and there i s 
nothing in Sec-2 Ckkk) which would al low by pass ing of 
the d e f i n i t i o n and i t cannot be implied into t h i s prov i -
s ion that only a man who has got a r ight ««ould come in 
the purview of Seo-2 (kkk) • Ihe quest ion i s not one of 
right to get employment but one of the 'badl i* having ^ 
cooipleted 240 days of continuous s e r v i c e . 
I t Is correct that the d e f i n i t i o n of 
32 
•workman* does not exclude a *badll* but * P. Joseph 
proceeded on the foot ing that* Bxplainatlon to Sec-2 
(kkk) widened the scope of the s e c t i o n l oos ing s i g h t 
that l a y - o f f cannot be sa id to have taken p lace without 
any reference to the reasons g iven in the s e c t i o n . 
Merely by put t ing in one year*s continuous s e r v i c e a 
' b a d l i ' cannot be sa id to be l a i d - o f f i f he i s not 
provided work within t%«o hours of h i s so present ing 
himself a t the establishment a t the appointed t i n e . 
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May be he Is not provided work for non> avai l a b i l i t y of 
*badll* work because no permanent workman i s absent. 
Ihe true scope of Explaination to Sec-25C 
in including a 'badl i workman* t o the bene f i t s of l a y - o f f 
compensation i s given in Management of Shree Meenakshi 
33 Mi l l s In these wordsx '•When the expla inat ion t o Sec 
25C was put in# i t was on the ground that when a work-
man had been continuously working in a year within the 
course of which he has been working for 240 days i t i s 
reasonable to presume that in the ordinary circumstances 
he would be provided with employment and therefore when 
the whole industr ia l un i t i s working he would a l s o have 
got employment. Ihat t r i a l un i t had ceased %forking and a l l 
i t s workmen 1 a id-of f . In such circumstances there i s no 
d i f f i c t i l t y about the holding that badl i workmen who f a l l 
within the expla inat ion t o Sec-25c would be e n t i t l e d to 
l a y - o f f compensation". 
Ihat was a l s o the reasoning in Lakshmi Mi l l s 
vAiere the High court allowed the claim for l a y - o f f conpe-
nsat ion of a *badli workman* who had completed one y e a r ' s 
continuous s erv i ce . The *badli workman* along with other 
worknan# was not given work on account of power cut . I t 
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was held that but for such power cut the 'badl l workman* 
would have been employed continuously as he had been 
employed before. In these c ircumstances , i t was c o n s i -
dered unnecessary t o examine whether any permanent 
workman was on l e a v e and whether the 'badll* found 
himself without employment through the absence of a l eave 
vacancy. Such an enquiry i t i s submitted, would be neces -
sary when i t i s not a case of l a y - o f f of a l l the workmen 
of the establ ishment . To claim l a y - o f f a *badli*, must 
not be one who i s only on the 'badl i* l i s t and would have 
only a chance of employment i f a permanent post becomes 
vacant but h i s potent ia l r ight s must be actualIsed on the 
34 day in quest ion . 
K. Damodran. All Kerala Cashewnut Factory workers 
Federation & Ors .-
On a reference of a d i spute , the Industr ia l 
Tribunal, Kollam, came to the conclusion that the respon-
dent workmen were e n t i t l e d to g e t f u l l wages for a period 
during which the factory was c lo sed . The writ p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
content ion was that the industry being a seasonal one, 
l a y - o f f compensation or wages for the period of c lo sure 
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could not be claimed by the wor)cmen, Agrieved by the 
Industrial Tribunal's award of full wages to the 
workmen the writ petitioner field the writ In High 
couet. 
The court held» though adjudication (by 
an industrial Tribunal) can and must protect industrial 
employees from malafides# victimisation and# unreason-
able steps* a finding in regard to a dispute should 
be drawn only where the evidence would justify it. It 
should not be made either in a casual manner or light 
heartedly. In the present case there was no evidence to 
Justify the findings. The seasonal character of the 
cashewnut industry was a broad day light situation; the 
resort to Section 25K(2) was unnecessary and unjustified. 
It is impossible to hold that the closure 
was a lay-off; the factory did not function due to non-
availability of bank finance. 
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CHAPTER - V 
CONCSPT OF RSTRENCHI^NT 
ffiiVNING OP RETRSNCH^E.NT iRIOR TO THi^  INTRODUCTIOW OF ISFINX-
TI6H ItJ 'tm-TZTi 
The concept of retrenchment in our law corresponds t o 
redundancy* in English I^w. Termination for reasons of redun-
dancy i s considered t o be a form of d ismissa l and i t i s p ro-
vided t h a t d ismissa l s h a l l be for redundancy if i t i s wholly 
or mainly a t t r i b u t a b l e to shut down of business (e i ther on 
closure or t ransfer of ukidertaking) and the employee becoming 
surplus t o the requirements of the employer, 
2 
The element of surplusage was held t o be an e s s e n t i a l 
ingradient t o cons t i tu te retrenchment and the e a r l i e s t view 
in India favoured tha t t h i s could be so in case of c losure 
too, thus , corresponding e n t i r e l y t o the English concept of 
redundancy. In Employees of India Reconstruction Corporation 
t r i b u n a l observed, 
"Ordinari ly retrenchment means discharge from service of 
only th» surplus pa r t of the labour force, but in tha case 
of c losure the whole labour force i s dispensed wi th . In subs-
tance the difference between closure and normal retrenchment 
i s one of degree on ly . " 
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The express ion 'retrenchi^ent* was examined by the 
Supreme court in Pipraich Sugar Mill where the c o u r t , 
a f t e r examining the scheme of the Act, held that the 
e n t i r e schme of the Act (as i t stood prior t o 1953 amend-
ment) assumed that there was an industry in e x i s t e n c e and 
hence retrenchment has meaning only in reference t o an 
industry which i s running and not one which i s c l o s e d , 
Punjab L»D. & R.C. Ltd Btc V,P.0 . Iab« Court B t c . H 
LL.J, 1990 70SC. 
The question in the ins tant case as to whether the 
express ion 'retrenchment* i s to be interpreted only to mean 
the discharge of surplus labour and to exclude from i t s* , 
atrbit discharge of workmen for any reason whatsoever other 
than those express ly excluded by the d e f i n i t i o n of the term 
in Sec 2(00) of the Act . Supreme Court in t h i s case held that 
the express ion 'retrenchment* means termination by the emplo-
yer of the s erv i ce s of a workmen for any reason whatsoever 
except those express ly excluded in t h e s e c t i o n . 
BEAMING UNIER Tt£ DEFINITION OF Ttfl ACT I 
The term retrenchment as defined in Sec 2 (00) was examine 
ed by the Supreme court in Barai Light Railways and Harl ffasad 
where the court adorsed the ordinary meaning as l a i d down b y i t 
in PLpraich Sugar Ml l i s ^ Jn Pipraich Sugar Mi l l s? The court 
observed! 'retrenchment connotes in i t s ordinary accepta t ion 
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t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s i t s e l f i s b e i n g c o n t i n u e d b u t t h a t a p o r t i o n 
of s t a f f o r t h e labour f o r c e i s d i s c h a r g e d a s s u r p l u s a g e . This 
meaning of retrenchment was found t o f i t i n t o the s t a t u o t y 
d e f i n i t i o n and i n Hari flrasad^ the c o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d the d e f i -
n i t i o n t o mean what the e x p r e s s i o n o r d i n a r i l y meant. S e c t i o n 
2 (00) i s a s s u c h t h a t retrenchment means the t e r m i n a t i o n by 
the employer o f the s e r v i c e of a workman for any reason what-
sOBver, o t h e r w i s e then a s a punishment i n f l i c t e d by way o f 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . 
SCOIS OF THS BXIRESSION FOR ANY REASON WHftTSCEVERt 
The d e f i n i t i o n of the term 'retrenchment* as g i v e n i n 
Sec 2 (C0)o f the Ac t c o n s i s t s o f two p a r t s . The f i r s t p a r t i s 
e x h a u s t i v e which l a y s down what re trenchment i s w h i l e the 
s econd e x c l u d e s t e r m i n a t i o n of s e r v i c e f o r c e r t a i n r e a s o n s 
from t h e a n b i t of re trenchment . 
l e a v i n g o u t the o c c l u d i n g s u b - c a l u s e s (a) , (bMnd(c^ the 
d e f i n i t i o n when a n a l y s e d c o n s i s t s o f four e s s e n t i a l r e q u i r e -
ments v i z (a) t e r m i n a t i o n of s e r v i c e of a workman (b)by t h e 
employer ( c ) f o r any reason whatsoever and (d>otherwise than 
as a punishment i n f l i c t e d by way of d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . 
On t h e q u e s t i o n whether the e x p r e s s i o n *any reason^what -
s o e v e r * i s s u s c e p t e b l e t o any l i m i t a t i o n s or admits no e x c e j ^ 
t i o n ? t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e d i v e r g e n c e o f ' J u d i c i a l o p i n i o n . • 
9 jfo Hari a:asad» a f i v e judges bench of the Supreme c o u r t 
r u l e d : "vihat a f t e r a l l i s the meaning o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n * f o r 
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any reason. Whatsoever, 'when a portion of the staff or labour 
force is discharged as surplusage in a running or continuing 
business the termination of service which follows may be due 
to a variety of reasons, e.g. for economy, rationalisation in 
industry, installation of a new labour saving machinery etc. 
The legislature, in using the expression any reason whatsoever' 
says in effect,' It does not matter why you are discharging 
the surplus, if the other requirement of the definition are 
fulfilled,then it is retrenchment•«.. We held., that retrench-
ment as defined in Sec 2(00) and as used in Sec 25-P has no 
wider meaning than the ordinary accepted connotation of the 
word, jt means the discharging of surplus labour or staff by 
the employer for any other reason whatsoever otherwise than as 
a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action,,. On our 
interpretation, in no case is there any retrenchment of surp-
lus labour or staff in a continuing or running indhstry," 
The ratio of Hari Prasad,was affirmed by other five judge 
bench of Supreme Court in Anakapoda Society, and followed by 
High Courts holding that the expression 'retrenchment'meant 
13 discharge of the surplusage. The supreme Court in State Bank, 
case held that 'whatever the reason' includes every termina-
tion spells retrencliment giving a liberal meaning to the exp-
ression retrenchment* as defined in Sec 2(00), 
The decision of the above case created some confusion 
leading some High courts to hold that to constitute necessary 
simple discharge of a bank employee under Sastry Award,^4 
59 
termination of services of a workman for not qualifying in 
Selection test and compulsory retirement •'•o 
were held to be retrenchment. A division bench of the Madras 
17 High Court observed that presence of surplus labour was not 
the Sine Quannonfor retrenchment, 
18 Close on the heels of State Bank » case came Hindustan 
19 20 
Steels affirming State Bank, and also holding : We do not 
21 
find anything in Hari P ra sad ' s case which i s i ncons i s t en t 
with what has been held in Sta te Bank 's case , 
23 
State Bank's case, the facts in short, vjere that the 
bank employed the respondent employee as a temporary employee 
because the permanent cashier was away. When the permanent 
cashier joined his duties , Sundramoney services were dis-
24 pens ed with. The High Court had taken the view that such 
temvx>rary hands driftsd even in exceptional or extraordinary 
contingencies or in temporary vacancies would become surplus 
on • the return of the permanent incumbents to the job. The 
High court adhered to the rule of surplusage, 
2b 
In Hindustan Steel, the workmen were employed as head 
time keepers for a period of three years. In the meantime 
pursuant to a policy to "streamline the organisation and to 
effect economics wherever possible," the employer chose not 
to renew the contracts of service of the workmen. It was in 
this background that the court gave its judgement. But the 
60 
pronouncement was very c l e a r g o i n g beyond the c I r e urns c r i po-
t i o n of t h e f a c t s t h a t automat ic t e r m i n a t i o n t y e f f l u x o f 
t i m e amounted t o r e t r e n c h m e n t . Prom the p r o v i s o t o S e c - 2 5 B 
(a j which p r o v i d e s t h a t no n o t i c e r e q u i r e d thereunder s h a l l 
b e n e c e s s a r y i f t h e retrenchment* i s under an agreement 
which s p e c i f i c s a date for t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of s e r v i c e , t h e 
c o u r t i n f e r r e d t h a t the p r o v i s o would ha*e b e e n n e c e s s a r y 
i f re trenchment as d e f i n e d not t o i n c l u d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
s e r v i c e by e f f l u x of t ime i n terms of agreement be tween 
t h e p a r t i e s . 
An a t tempt was made by t h e High Courts o f D e l h i , 
2*7 2fi 29 
Kerala and Bombay ° t o read S t a t e Bank c a s e and Hindustan 
S t e e l ' s c a s e i n t h e i r f a c t u a l background and hold t h a t r e -
trenchment meant d i s c h a r g e of s u r p l u s labour o n l y , 
31 In Robert D'Souza f u l l bench of Kerala High Court 
32 
r e l i e d on t h e o b s e r v a t i o n i n Hindustan S t e e l t h a t t h e r e waa 
33 
no i n c o n s i s t e n c y between tfari arasad and t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e 
35 l a i d down i n Hari flrasad t h a t retrenchment meant d i s c h a r g e 




adopted by a d i v i s i o n bench of t h e i s sa High Court i n 
37 S h r i Ram I n s t i t u t e and Ramieshkumar^ d i v i s i o n benches of 
D e l h i and Bombay High Courts r e s p e c t i v e l y , examined the 
39 
scheme o f t h e Act, De lh i High Court o b s e r v e d . 
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"From the scheme of the Act itself It can be 
demonstrated that 'retrenchment* means only 
termination of surplus staff and does not 
include the discharge of a workman for unsa-
tisfactory worko section 25-G of the Act 
applies the rule of last come first go to 
retrenchment. Such a rule can be applied only 
when the only distinction between the several 
persons retrenchment is who was employed last 
that he may be retrenched first. This empha-
sises that the termination is not due to un-
satisfactory work. Similarly item iO of fourth 
scheduled of the Act is rationalisation,stand-
ardisation or improvement of plant or technique 
which is likely to lead to retrenchment of work-
men. This also shows that the word 'retrenchment' 
in the Act has been used to denote termination 
of surplus for reasons of economy etc. but not 
for unsatisfactory work." 
Carry further the examination of the scheme of the 
40 Act, Bombay High Oourt observed: 
"A plain reading of Section 2A gives a clear 
and infailing indication that the legislature 
itself had no intention of confusing or identi-
fying retrenchment with other forms of termina-
tion of service.... This section (25H) casts an 
obligation and makes it mandatory on the employer 
not only to take back a retrenched worker but 
also to give preference to such workmen over 
others, it would be analogous to the point of 
absurdity and would result in a horrifying, who 
terminates the service of his workman for loss 
of confidence or inefficiency or in subordina-
tion and the like, is to be expected, may to 
be compelled to re-employ that every worker in 
the same Industry or business and that workmen 
whose seirvices are not terminated either for 
loss of confidence, inefficiency, in subordina-
tion and the like," 
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41 In Shri Ram Institute, it was obser>red that 
42 43 
decision in State Bank and Hindustan Steel, given by 
Bench of three judges can not be construed to depart 
from the law laid down by a Bench of five judges, Nambiar C. 
jt^went a step further in saying that the court was bound 
to follow the Five judges Bench decision in Barasi Light 
45 46 
Railway and Hari Pras<ad» In preference to State Bank or 
47 
Hindustan steel. 
The recent trend that 'Whatever the reason every 
termination spells retrenchment, giving a literal meaning 
to the expression 'retrenchment' as defined in Sec 2 (00), 
48 49 
set by the Supreme court in State Bank, Hindustan Steel, 
and General Mills , has been confirmed in Santosh Gupta, 
52 
and Mohan Lai. 
53 In Santosh Gupta's case a two judge bench of the 
Supreme Court discountenanced the contention that retrench-
ment means discharge of a workman on account of surplusage* 
by observing that if it is so there was no need to d efine 
the expression and in such wide terms. In such a situation 
54 
answer of the court in Hari Prasad?s case was " It is 
true that an artificial definition may include a meaning 
different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation 
of the word which is the subject of the definition, but 
there must then be compelling words to shew that such a 
meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary mean-
ing is intended, where, within the framework of the ordi-
63 
exhaustive by way of contrast with discharge on account 
of transfer or closure of business." 
But it was actually not so, supreme Court arrived at 
59 this conclusion in Hari prasads case, by not giving a 
literal meaning to the definition but cut down its magni-
tude and gave a narrower meaning to it. 
Although, Santosh Gupta's case, has been reaffirmed 
62 
by another two judges bench of tte Supreme Court in Mobanlal 
the court v;as looking only at the definition without any 
reference to the scheme of the Act. Whereas the concept of 
64 
surplusage is implicit in the scheme of the Act, As 
already seen in Ss 2A, 25E, 25H and item 10 of fourth sche-
dule. To this may also be added Ss 25 N, 25Q and Rules 76 
and 76A read with forms P and PA of the Industrial Dispute 
(Central) Rules, 1957 which all show the scheme of the Act 
to point out towards surplusage being treated as to retrench-
ment. The rule laid down by the supreme Court in Hari 
Prasad's case is the correct view. After a series of pro-
65 
nouncement of the Supreme Court since St^te Bank, in 
S.K, Verma, in a seper«|te judgement Pathak J, has 
recorded a candid and unequivocal dissent from the holding 
go 
in santosh Gupta, in observing "I mention this only because 
I should not be taken to have agreed with the interpretation 
of Sec 2(00) rendered in Santosh Gupta, It is submitted that 
70 
although Hari Prasad. lays down the correct law, yet if 
64 
nary accep ta t ion of the word, every s ing le requirement of 
d e f i n i t i o n c lause i s f u l f i l l e d , i t would be wrong to t ake 
the d e f i n i t i o n as des t roying the e s s e n t i a l meaning of the 
word d e f i n e d , " 
55 
Again in Santosh Gupta 's case the court heavi ly r e l i -
ed on the fact t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n expressly exclufled volun-
ta ry re t i rement or re t i rement of the workmen on reaching the 
age of superannuation which can hardly be descr ibed as t e r m i -
na t ion , by the employer, of the se rv ice of a workman, and 
concluded t h a t t h i s "emphasises the broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
t o be given to the express ion re t renchment ." Such a s i t u a t i o n 
56 
was noticaJby the Hari Prasad court as well where i t was 
pointed out t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n c lause i s i n a r t i s t i c a l l y 
drawn up and sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Sec-2 (00) a r e not 
eas i ly i n t e l l i g i b l e wi th reference t o one e s s e n t i a l r e q u i r e -
ment of t h e d e f i n i t i o n t h a t the te rminat ion of se rv ice of 
t be workman must be by the employer. The court fur ther sa id 
t h a t sub-clauses ( a ) , ( b ) and (c) "whteteher inse r t ed by way of 
abundant daution or on account of excess ive anxiety exclude 
c e r t a i n ca t egor i e s of terminat ion of s e rv i ce from the ambit 
of d e f i n i t i o n . They do not necessa r i ly show what i s to be 
included wi th in the d e f i n i t i o n . 
57 Fur the r , the r a t i o in Hari Prasad was glossed on in 
58 Santosh Gupta, with the observation that the reference to 
discharge on account of surplusage was "illustrative and not 
65 
t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r s t h a t i t does n o t lay down t h e c o r r e c t law 
i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o c o n s i t u t e a l a r g e r bench and r e s t a t e t h e law. 
Morinda Co-op Sugar M i l l s Ltd V Ram Krishan and Others 1966 
l a b . I . e . 2 2 1 . 
In t h i s c a s e t h e s e a s i o n a l workers were enaged o n l y d u r i n g 
t h e c r u s h i n g season i n Sugar f a c t o r y . They were c e a s e d t o worx 
s u b s e q u e n t t o c l o s u r e o f s e a s o n . The Supreme c o u r t i n t h i s c a s e 
he ld t h a t c e s s a t i o n d o e s n o t amount t o r e t r e n c h m e n t . However, 
c o u r t d i r e c t e d employer t o mainta in r e g i s t e r of workmen engaged 
dur ing p r e v i o u s s e a s o n s and t o p u b l i c i z e o n s e t o f new s e a s o n 
and engage the same workers i n accordance w i t h s e n i o r i t y and 
e x i g e n c y o f work. 
EXCLUDED CASKS : 
I . FUNISHNENT INFLICTBD BY WiVY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION; 
The d e f i n i t i o n s p e c i a l l y e x c l u d e d the t e r m i n a t i o n o f s e t v i c c 
as punishment i n f l i c t e d by way of d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n from t h e 
ambit o f r e t r e n c h m e n t . In f a c t t e r m i n a t i o n o f s e r v i c e by way of 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n i s d i r e c t l y i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the t e r m i n a t i o n 
by way o f re trenchment a s the former i s by way o f punishment 
w h i l e the l a t t e r i s i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f economy or b e c a u s e t h e 
employer d i d not need the s e r v i c e s of t he workman who had 
71 become s u r p l u s . 
II.VOLUNTARY RBTlRRt^ajT > 
S u b - c l a u s e (a) o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y e x c l u d e s 
v o l u n t a r y r e t i r e m e n t o f t h e workman from the airbit o f d e f i n i t i o n 
a l t h o u g h v o l u n t a r y r e t i r e m e n t can h a r d l y be d e s c r i b e d a s t e r -
66 
inination by the employer, of the s e r v i c e of a workman, which 
72 i s e s s e n t i a l t o c o n s t i t u t e retrenchment but t h i s might have 
been inser ted by way of abundant caut ion or on account of e x c e -
73 
s s i v e anxi*ty for c l a r i t y . 
The words voluntary retirement indicate that unless the 
termination of the serv ice i s the r e s u l t of a voluntary move 
on the part of the employee, he can not be s a i d t o have volun-
tary r e t i r e d , A mere submission of the employee t o the termina-
t i o n of h is serv iee by the employer can not be sa id t o be v o l -
untary a c t of the former. A voluntary retirement i s the a c t 
of the employee j u s t as d i smissa l or removal from s e r v i c e i s the 
74 
ac t of employer. The cases of res igning the job would a l s o f a l l 
75 
under t h i s head. 
I I I . SUIERANNUATION t 
Clause (b)of aec 2(00) provides tha t retrenchment does not 
include retirement of workman on reaching the age of superannua-
t i o n i f the contract of employment between the employer and the 
employee concerned contains a s t i p u l a t i o n i n that behalf .under 
t h i s c l a u s e two things were necessary one was that i n the cont -
ract of employment between the employer and the aaployee there 
must be a s t i p u l a t i o n concerning ret irement and the second thing 
was tha t the s t i p u l a t i o n must be wi th regard to the age of sup-
76 
erannuat±on. In DBsikachari, some workmen who were 58 Yrs of 
age or more were r e t i r e d and the employer took the view that in 
the circumstances of t h e case I t should be considered as a case 
o f ret irement of employees on reaching the age of superannuation, 
In the contract of s erv i ce of the concerned workmen there was 
67 
the s t i p u l a t i o n as regards ret irement on reachliig,any par t i cu lar 
age nor d id the Standing Orddrs of the company provide for super-
annuation of the employees a t a part icu lar age. The management 
claimed that the workmen concerned had passed the age which,accor-
ding t o normal standards* was considered and akccepted as t h e age 
of retirement in commercial concerns and indus tr ia l e s tab l i shments . 
This was not accepted by the Madras High Court and the case held 
t o f a l l outs ide exception(b,) of the d e f i n i t i o n c l a u s e . 
78 In Fibre Foam's case Kerala High Court ruled that although 
the age of superannuation mentioned under Sec 2 (r^of the payment 
78 
of Gratuity Act could not be appl ied while adj\xling the case of 
retrenchment but workman having accepted gratuity money from his 
employer based on the provis ion of the payment of Gratuity A c t , i t 
was not open t o him t o plead t h a t i t was a case of retrenchment. 
From t h i s i t i s c l e a r that in the absence of any mention of 
age of superannuation in the contract of employment, i f an employer 
terminates the s e r v i c e i f an emplcyee on account of o ld age, i t 
would amount t o retrenchment under the wider concept but not so 
i f i t i s t o be taken as discharge of surplus which appears t o be 
the correc t v iew. I t would be proper t o s t i p u l a t e in the Act some 
age of superannuation in the absence of any s t i p u l a t i o n in the 
contract of employment in t h i s regard. 
IV, CONTimiBD IIL-HEALTH> 
Clause (c)of Sec-2 (OO)excludes termination of s e r v i c e on the 
ground of continued i l l health from the ambit of retrenchment. 
68 
80 in Burrakur Ooal Co is case the court said that 
"health" does not necessarily means absence of organic disease, 
If a person Is Infirm or not sound either In body or mind, or 
so at he can not be said to possess health and continued ill 
health, includes any physical defect or infirmity incapaci-
tating a workman for future work for (an indefinite work for) 
an indefinite period. This was followed by Madras High Court 
81 82 
in Madurai Mills* case , suffering from Leprosy and mental 
88 derangement were held to be continued ill-health". In the 
case of a workman suffering cardiac trouble and applying for 
84 two months leave illness was held not to be continuous. 
85 In Banglore Woilen , Supreme Oourt observed that a 
service can not be said to be terminated unless it was capa-
ble of being continued where a ivorkman is discharged on the 
ground of ill-health it is because he was unfit to discharge 
the service which he had undertaken to render and, therefore, 
it had really come to an end itself. This suggests that even 
clauses (c) of Sec 2(00) is excessive and but for it also, 
termination of service on ground of continued ill-health, 
not gg 
would/be retrenchment. This was indicated in Harl Prasadjs 
caseo 
V. E M P I J O Y E R ' S PREROGATIVE TO ORGANISE HIS BUSII^ISSx 
A r e o r g a n i s a t i c n o f h i s b u s i n e s s by t h e e m p l o y e r may 
r e s u l t i n r e t r e n c h m e n t of some workmen. In s u c h a s i t u a t i o n 
d o e s an I n d u s t r i a l T r i b u n a l o r c o u r t s i t i n a p p e a l o v e r t h e 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e e m p l o y e r ? 
69 
m examining the Management's decision the criterion 
is always the bona fide judgement of the management in the 
87 light of their knowledge and anticipations. In J»K«iron's 
8 8 
steel's Co, V Mazdoor Union, Supreme court said that "the 
decision to retrench should be judged, as regards to its 
justification, born upon bonafides and upon the reasonable-
ness of the decision in the situation that contrasted the 
89 
management. In Macropollo & Co.Pvt. the court observed 
that if the reorganised scheme was adopted for reasons of 
economy and convenience, the fact that its implementation 
would lead to retrenchment of some workmen would have no 
material bearing on the bonafides of the management. It is 
within the discretion of an employer to organise his busi-
90 
ness m any manner be considers most expedient, so long as 
this is done bonafide, the Industrial Tribunal is not comp-
91 
etent to question its propriety. An employer has freedom 
92 to weed out "the dead weight of uneconomic surplus labour. 
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CHiVFIER - VI 
RBQUISITSS OF A VALID RBTRSKCHNENT AND RB-BMPLCYMBNTi 
INTRODUCTCRY: 
The Act pos tu la tes c e r t a i n condi t ions to be f u l f i l l e d by 
an employer for e f f e c t i n g a v a l i d retrenchment. These condi-
t i o n s are given as condi t ion precedent t o Retrenchment and 
jProcedure for retrenchment, the former in Ss 25P and 25N and 
the l a t t e r in Sec 25G of the Act . 
Sec 25H lays down the provis ion for employment of r e -
trenched workmen. 
Nathaniel Masih y u .p . Scheduled Caste Finance and Develop-
ment Corporation Lbd and others (199 i ; I I Ifib.L.J. 347(Al l^ . 
m t h i s case the s e r v i c e s of a Driver of t h e Corporation 
were terminated without paying any compensation under Sec t ion 
25F of the Act . The funct ion of corporation i s t o organise 
and work in various ways for upliftment of down trodden,he lp 
them f i n a n c i a l l y for various purposes ,Including s t a r t i n g i n -
d u s t r i e s and helping them i n g e t t i n g t echn ica l t r a i n i n g . I t 
was held that in view of he various a c t i v i t i e s be ing carr ied 
on by the corporation i t i s an industry within the meaning 
of the Indus tr ia l Dispures Act and termination of the ir 
s e r v i c e s amounts t o retrenchment which being in v i o l a t i o n of 
S e c t i o n 25-F i s i l l e g a l . 
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CONDITIOtIS fRECBCBNT TO RSTRSNCH^El^ ? t 
Conditions precedent to retrenchment as s p e c i f i e d 
in Ss 2 5F and 25N are s imi lar varying only in degree ; 
Both these sec t ions are captioned "^o workman.,, who 
has been in continuous s e r v i c e for not l e s s than one 
year under an employer s h a l l be retrenched by t h a t emp-
loyer u n t i l l , . , , * The negative form adopted by these 
prov is ions coupled with the use of word "until*** which 
introduces the c o n d i t i o n s . This i n d i c a t e that the 
c o n d i t i o n s must be s a t i s f i e d before retrenchment can 
2 
be v a l i d l y e f f ec ted but a look a t the three condi t ions 
namely 
1, notice or wages in view of notice, 
2, compensation for retrenchment and 
3, notice to appropriate government and their 
intendment* _ 
\ * 
Ace "> • >», 
<^3>-i:-i'?7V^/#/ 
- - . - - * 
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shows and that all three conditions were not meant to be 
strictly as conditions precedent. In Bombay Union of 
Journalists V State of Bombayj the supreme court clari-
fied that its observation in Subong Tea Estate V S.T.Sstate 
that three conditions prescribed by clause (a)(b) and (c) 
of Sec 25F appear prima facie to constitute conditions 
precedent before an industrial workman can be validly 
retrenched should be regarded as being in the nature of 
abiter observations. The court said that only clause (a) 
and (b) were mandatory pre-conditions for valid retrench-
ment because they were intended to protect the interest 
of the workman where as the same could not be said of 
clause (c) intended to intimate the Government, With regard 
to the requirement of notice or wages in lieu of notice 
to be given to the workmen proposed to be retrenched as 
contained in clauses (a) of Ss 25F and sub-section (1) 
of Sec 25 N respectively. It has been that this require-
ment affords a safeguard to a retrenched v/orkman. The 
notice or payment in lieu of notice has to precede the 
retrenchment and not follow it? 
Regarding payment of compensation for retrenchment 
it was said that the object of the legislature had in 
mind in making this condition obligatory and a condition 
precedent was to partially redress the hardship caused by 




retrenchment and not when not i ce i s g iven , ftyment of compen-
s a t i o n for retrenchment i s a g iven payment of comppensation 
for retrenchment i s a cond i t ion precedent'and even i f the work-
man rece ived compensation subsequent t o the order of re trench-
ment. They w i l l not be stopped from chal langing the l e g a l i t y 
and v a l i d i t y of the order of retrenchment. 
The requirement of not ice t o government was not held t o be 
a c o n d i t i o n precedent as the other two condit ions even though i t 
has been included in the Sec t ion laying down condi t ions prece-
den^o Supreme Court pointed out that unl ike other has require -
ment, requirement of n o t i c e to appropriate government i s not i n -
tended t o protect the i n t e r e s t of workman as such and i t i s only 
intended t o g ive int imat ion t o t h e appropriate government about 
the retrenchment, and that only helps the government t o keep i t -
s e l f informed about the condi t ions of employment i n d i f f e r e n t 
i n d u s t r i e s within i t s reg ion , and i t i s not a cond i t ion prece -
dent H 
Although not ice t o appropriate government i s not a con-
d i t i o n precedent i t i s mandatory requirement. This la ev ident 
from the observat ion of the Supreme Court. I n Bombay Union of 
13 Journa l i s t that "the breach of Sec 2 5 ( c ) i s no doubt a ser ious 
m a t t e r . . . .'* 
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BFFBGT OP NON-COMPLIAWCB WITH CONDITIONS JRJSCSnSNTt 
Supreme court has held that noncetnpliance with the con-
d i t i o n s precedent t o retrenchment namely t o g ive no t i ce or 
pay wages in l i e u of not ice t o the workman and t o pay compen-
s a t i o n for retrenchment a t the time of retrenchment w i l l fender 
the impugned retrenchment inva l id and inoperat ive? But whether 
the order of retrenchment become non-est for non compliance or 
only i l l e g a l and i n v a l i d ? In Adaishwar 1^1 V labour Courts 
Delhi High Court held that the order of retrenchment in v i o l a -
t i o n of the condit iond precedent was i n v a l i d and inoperat ive 
but nonetheless i t was not non-est and i t was open t o the work-
man not t o chal lenge i t , accept i t and c la im only retrenchment 
compensation. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s or otherwise of t h e order was 
not r e l evant t o the question whether there was an order and 
i t would not be open t o the employer who passed the order t o 
say t h a t , as he did not fol low the prescr ibed procedure, i t 
was not tha t i s purported t o b e . This was a l s o the view of 
17 18 19 
Mysore, Rajasthan and Kerala"^ High Court. The l a t t e r 
c l a s s i f y i n g that the use of word "inoperative'" by the Supreme 
Court i n Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case was only c a s u a l . 
I t i s submitted t h a t the above view i s correc t and the 
condi t ion prescribed are precedent t o v a l i d retrenchment and 
21 
not merely t o the a c t of retrenchment, 
NOTICB OR WftGBS IM L3EU OF NOTICB i 
Clause (a) of Sec-25F and c l a u s e (a^of sub-c lause (1) 
of Sec 25N r e s p e c t i v e l y provide t h a t the workman proposed 
t o be retrenched should be given one month's n o t i c e or three 
81 
months notice as the case may be in writing indicating 
the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice 
should not expire before retrenchment. Alternatively, it 
provides that the workman may be paid in lieu of such 
notice wages for the period of notice. Where the retrenchme-
nt is under an agreement which specifics a date for termi-
nation of service no notice is required. 
The first part of these clause prescribe the require-
ment of "notice" in writing indicating the reasons for 
retrenchment, indicating that the reasons for retrenchment 
are to be indicated in the notice. The second part dispen-
ses with the requirement of notice in case where the work-
man has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for this 
period of notice. The two parts are completely independent. 
The employer has to either give notice in writing indica-
ting the reasons for retrenchment, as to make payment of 
wages in lieu of notice where wages in lieu of notice have, 
been paid, the requirement of indicating reasons does not 
22 
survive. 
It has already been seen that the requirement of 
notice or wages in lieu thereof to a workman is an essen-
tial condition precedent to a valid retrenchment. 
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RSTRBNCHtCNT COMISSNATION t 
OBJECT« Sven prior t o the s tatutory provis ion for retrenchment 
conpensation^ i n d u s t r i a l t r ibunals had admitted the c laim of 
workmen for retrenchment compensation on grounds of s o c i a l Jus t -
23 i c e , Tli« s ta tu tory provis ions for payment of retrenchment comp .^ 
ensat ion merely standardized the pract ice which was genera l ly 
24 
p r e v a l e n t . The r ight created for retrenchment compensation i s 
designed t o r e l i e v e the hardship caused by unemployment due t o 
25 
no fau l t of the employee with regard to redundancy payment in 
U«K*^  i t has been s a i d t h a t the compensation paid i s in respect 
of the l o s s suffered and i s not intended on a b e n e f i t t o t ide 
• 26 
the redundant employee over a period of d i f f i c u l t y . This i s c lear 
from the r i g h t vested in the retrenched workmen t o claim compen-
s a t i o n even i f he does not wish t o cha l lenge his retrenchment 
and claim reinstatement may be because he has secured some a l -
ternate employment. 
In contras t t o gra tu i ty and provident fund which are r e t i -
rement benef i t s ,retrenchment compensation i s not a ret irement 
27 b e n e f i t , and i s not c o n s i s t e n t t o g r a t u i t y or provident fund 
scheme* 
Yashwant Singh Yadav V S t a t e of Rajasthan & o thers , 1991 f l . I a b , 
L.J. 501 (Ral ) . I t was held in t h i s case that the d e f i n i t i o n of 
workmen in s e c t i o n 2(S) does not make a d i s t i n c t i o n between a 
f u l l time employee and a part time employee.The terminat ion of 
even a part time employee amounts t o retrenchment and i f provi -
s ions of Sec t ion 25r are not fol lowed retrenchment w i l l not be 
v a l i d . 
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qo^NTUMt (Clause (b) of Sec 25F and c l a u s e (b)of Sub-c lause (1) 
of S^c 25N lay down t h a t as a c o n d i t i o n p receden t t o re t renchm-
e n t , a workmen should be paid compensat ion a t t h e t ime of r e t -
29 
renchment a t t h e r a t e of f i f t e e n days "average pay? f o r every 
s e r v i c e or any p a r t t he reo f i n excess of s i x months . 
WHEN gWYABISi 
The compensat ion f o r re t renchment must b e pa id a t t h e 
t ime of r e t r enchmen t , 
UNCONDITIONAL TSNDBR OF COMIENSATION BQUIVAIKNT TO BVYMSKT > 
An uncond i t i ona l o f f e r of payment ,preceding r e t r e n c h m e n t , 
was held t o be e q u i v a l e n t t o payment. This was a r e s u l t of r e -
a l i s a t i o n t h a t i t might be d i f f i c u l t t o make a workman accep t 
payment i f he w i l l no t himself do th<i t . In itepsu T r a n s p o r t Co. 
31 
P v t . L t d . V S t a t e of Punjab, i t was c l a s s i f i e d t h a t a mere n o t i -
c e c a l l i n g upon t h e workmen t o r e c e i v e payment wag no t e q u i v a -
l e n t t o a c t u a l payment because an employer may not be fo r good 
r e a s o n s , a b l e t o go and r e c e i v e payment on the day f i x e d . I t was 
t hen o b l i g a t o r y on t h e employer t o send t h e payment t o him and 
i t was only when he would be s a i d t o have complied wi th t h e 
c o n d i t i o n px:ecedent,ffedhya iE^adesh High Court he ld t h a t payment 
i n c l u d e s *offfer p rov ided i t i s d e f i n i t e unequivocal and genuin* 
32 I t would not be mere p r e t e x t or show of an o f f e r . I t a c t u a l 
payment i n cash a t t h e very spo t of re t renchment i s i n s i s t e d 
on i t may lead t o obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s . Care has t o be t a k e n 
t h a t management does not put off paying workers which has t o 
33 
make i t s endeavour t o pay . 
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when r e t r e n c h m e n t c o m p e n s a t i o n was p a i d on t h e same 
day b u t a f t e r t h e b a n k i n g h o u r s and cheque e n c a s h e d t h e n e x t 
d a y , i t was h e l d t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t was n o t f o l l o w -
34 
e d . T h i s i s s u b m i t t e d t h a t i t i s n o t a c o r r e c t v i e w and 
i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n b e n c h r u l i n g of t h e High C o u r t 
t h a t payment by c h e q u e i s a v a l i d payment f o r t h e p u r p o s e 
35 
o f t h i s p r o v i s i o n , 
LAST GOM£-FIRST GO^RULE PROCEDURE FOR RETRfitJCHMEI'Tr t 
S e c t i o n 2 5 G p r o v i d e s f o r t h e p r o c e d u r e t o b e f o l l o w e d 
w h i l e e f f e c t i n g r e t r e n c h m e n t . T h i s s e c t i o n g i v e s l e g i s l a t i v e 
r e c o g n i t i o n t o t h e w e l l r e c o g n i s e d p r i n c i p l e o f r e t r e n c h m e n t 
i n i n d u s t r i a l law i . e . " f i r s t come l a s t g o , " o r " L a s t come 
f i r s t g o . " 
The r u l e i s t o be f o l l o w e d o r d i n a r i l y i s wha t i s p r o -
v i d e d by s e c 2 5 E , I f t h e r e i s an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e employ-
e r and t h e workman, t h e n t h a t p r e v a i l s . The d o c t r i n e c a n b e 
a l t e r e d , m o d i f i e d o r c o m p l e t e l y a b r o g a t e d by an a g r e e m e n t . 
The r u l e i s n o t r i g i d o r u n i f o r m i n i t s a p j ^ l i c a t i o n 
and it r e c o g n i s e a d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e e m p l o y e r t o d e p a r t 
from t h i s r u l e b u t s u c h a d i s c r e t i o n h a s t o b e e x e r c i s e d 
36 
f o r v a l i d r e a s o n s w h i c h mus t b e d i s c l o s e d i n t h e n o t i c e . 
To c l a i m t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e r u l e l a s t come f i r s t 
go** an employee mus t f u l f i l l t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : 
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1. he should be a workman 
2. he should be a citizen of India. 
3. The industrial establishment from where tte is retren-
ched must be a industry. 
4. he should belong to a particular category of workman^, 
5. there should be no agreement contrary to the rule. 
These conditions must be satisfied comulatively. The 
legislature has taken the caution not to make compliance 
with this procedure a cast iron requirement, as in the 
course of industrial relations myriads of contingencies 
arise in different situations. The procedure, therefore, 
has been lodged with several cautions and safeguards, use 
of word "ordinarily" indicates that though the procedure 
of "last come first go" should normally be adhered to, 
where the exegencies of an industry so demand, procedure 
can be departed from and only requirement in case of depar-
ture from the rule is to record reasons for such departure. 
Further the doctrine has to be borne in mind only 
with regard to different categories of workman working in 
an industrial establishment and not to the whole of indus-
37 
trial establishment. There is however, a clear distinction 
between a class or category and a grade. The class or cate-
gory is a group in which posts of particulars description 
are included and grade has reference exclusively to scales 
of pay. Category is not synonymous with grade. Category 
means a class or trade such as turner, motor machanic elec-
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38 e l e c t r i c i a n e t c . Affirming t h i s d e c i s i o n i n appeal , supreme 
court observed that grading for purposes of s c a l e s of pay and 
39 l ike cons iderat ion w i l l not crea te new c a t e g o r i s a t i o n . 
The court re jec ted the content ion that wi th in the same 
category i f grade for s c a l e s of pay based on length of s e r v i -
ce e t c , are evolved, that process amounts t o crea t ion of 
40 seperate c a t e g o r i e s . Where other th ings being equal the r u l e 
of l a s t come f i r s t go" has t o bef fo l lowed. The ru le r e s t r i c t e d 
the Common law Right of t h e employer t o decide whom t o r e t r e n -
ch but at the same time i n t e r e s t s of business can not be ovar-
41 looked. The management must ac t f a i r l y t o employees. Where 
manag^nent bonafide r e t a i n s s t a f f possess ing s p e c i a l q u a l i f i -
cat ions in the i n t e r e s t of t h e business t h a t ac t ion cannot be 
42 
discarded merely because the r u l e i s not observed; where 
there i s a departure from the r u l e , there should be r e l i a b l e 
evidence preferably in the recorded his tory of the workman 
concerned, showing t h e i r i n e f f i c i e n c y u n r e l i a b i l i t y or habitu-
A ^ A A 
a l i r r e g u l a r i t y . The ru le i s t o be appl ied unit w i s e . 
GOISSQUSNCBS OF NON-COMPLJANCE WITH THE RUIE t 
Courts have always taken the view that i f the r u l e i s 
not followed and there i s no J u s t i f i c a t i o n for departure from 
45 
the r u l e the order of retrenchment would be rendered i n v a l i d . 
This shows t h a t fo l lowing of t h i s procedure i s a l s o an e s s e n -
t i a l requirement t o e f f e c t a v a l i d retrenchment. 
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RBQUISITB OF A VAIJD RSTRBNCH^ENT» 
Prom t h e foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , r e q u i s i t e s of a 
v d l i d re t renchment may be s t a t e d as follows t 
1, The employer must g ive no t i ce In w r i t i n g t o t h e 
workman proposed t o be ' r e t r e n c h e d ' . The n o t i c e 
must c o n t a i n t h e r easons for re t renchment and 
must be t h r e e month ' s i n case of b i g g e r I n d u s t r i a l 
est<ibl ishments and one month's i n o t h e r e s t a b l i s h -
ments . A l t e r n a t i v e l y t h e employer must pay wages 
i n l i e u of t h e n o t i c e i n which c a s e t h e r e i s no 
o b j e c t i o n t o i n d i c a t e t h e reasons for r e t r enchmen t . 
No n o t i c e , however, i s necessary i n c a s e of an 
agreement s p e c i f y i n g a da te for t h e t e r m i n a t i o n 
of s e r v i c e of a workmen. 
2 . The employer must pay compensation f o r r e t r e n c h -
ment t o the workmen a t t h e t ime of r e t r e n c h m e n t . 
3o O r d i n a r i l y , t h e employer must fol low t h e ' l a s t 
come f i r s t go* r u l e i n e f f e c t i n g r e t r e n c h m e n t . 
Non-compliance w i th t h e s e r e q u i s i t e s w i l l r ende r 
t h e purpor ted re t r enchment i n v a l i d . 
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RE-EMPLDYMENT OF RETREMGHSD WORKMEN; 
Industrial adjudication generally recognised the 
principle that if an employer retrenched the service of 
an employee on the ground that the employee in question 
had become surplus, it was necessary that whenever the 
employer had occasion to employ another hand the retrenched 
workman should be given an opportunity to join service on 
the ground that this principle was based on consideration 
46 
of fairplay and justice. 
By sec-25H statutory recognition is given to the rule 
already adopted in industrial adjudication. As enacted, the 
section imposed the statutory obligation, on the employer 
who has already retrenched some -.-orkmen and who proposes 
afterwards to take into his employment any person to give 
an opportunity to the retrenched workman to offer them-
selves for re-employment. By the latter part of the Section 
a further obligation is cast on the employer to give pre-
ference to the retrenched workman in the matter of re-
employment of the persons. The benefit of the rule, however, 
extends only to citizens of India, The mode of giving opp-
ortunity is not left to be determined by the employer con-
cerned. He must offer the opportunity in the preseribed 
manner for which the state Government have rule making 
power. 
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TERMS AND CXINDITIONS OF SERV3CS ON RE-EMPLOYMENT; 
The right vested in the retrenched workman is based 
on humane considerations and the object of the Act being 
to establish industrial peace and harmonious relations 
between labour and capital, the retrenched workmen are 
entitled to claim the same emoluments and terms and con-
47 
ditions as at the time of retrenchment. The contrary was 
taken by the Bombay High Oouirt that "re-employment" means 
taking back in employment but it does not necessarily 
imply that the taking back into service must be on the 
same terms and conditions to v/hich the employee was enti-
48 
tied previously. 
It is submitted that the latter view is correct. 
The former view ignores the possibility that between the 
time of his retrenchment and re-employment, the conditions 
of employment in the concerned industrial establishment, 
may have undergone a 'change for the better or worse by 
mutual settlement or adjudication or arbitration, and 
also that the usefulness or the capability of the workmen 
concerned may have undergone a change. In such circums-
tances an unqualified rule that re-employment must be 
offered on the same terms and conditions of service as 
obtained at the time of retrenchment Is not likely to meet 
90 
the ends of j u s t i c e , Ss 25H and 25G must be considered 
toge ther and so considered the o f fe r of re-employment 
would be condit ioned by the cons idera t ion of the c a t e -
49 
gory to which the retrenched employee belonged". Re-
employment Imparts the significance of taking back a 
retrenched workman in the same category to which he 
belonged. 
The provision of Sec 25H is mandatory in as much 
as the retrenched workman has to be given an opportunity 
to offer himself for re-employment and then the pre-
ference had to be given,^^ 
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1« Sec-25N applies to an industrial establishment (not 
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in 
which work is performed intermittintly) in which not 
less than 100 workmen were employed on a average per 
working day for the preceding twelve months, (Sec 
25K). To all other establishments Sec 25F is applica-
ble). Requirement of notice u/s 25F is one month and 
u/s 25 N it is three months<> Further Sec 25N also 
requires permission from the appropriate government 
far retrenchment. The validity of this provision is 
not free from doubt. In fact it has been struck down 
by Madras High Court, and is discussed separately in 
Chapter-7, 
2, X^orkmen of Subong Tea Estate v Subong Tea Estate 
(1984) loL.L.J. 333 (S.C, ). 
3, Bombay Union of Journalists V State of Bombay (1964) 
4. Supra note 2, 
5. Regarding clause (c) what has been said with reference 
to sec 25F can not said with reference to Sec 25N as 
in addition to notice to appropriate government, its 
permission also required but since that requirement 
has been held to be a unconstitutional (see Ch-7) it 
is being kept out of the purview of conditions prece-
dent. 
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CH k^PIER - VII 
PERMISSION FCR lAY-QFF AND RBTRBNCH^ENT 
SiEClAL glOVISION FCR PERMISSION FCR lAY-QFF AND RETREtyUHMaUT 
IN CERTAIN SSTABLISHMENT S; 
Chapter VB of t h e Act c o n t a i n s s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s re l a . 
t i n g t o l a y - o f f and retrenchment i n i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
(not b e i n g an e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a s e a s o n a l c h a r a c t e r o r i n w h i -
ch work i s performed i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ) i n which not l e s s than 
one hundred workmen^ were employed on a average per working 
day f o r t h e preced ing t w e l v e months . 
Sec-25M for l a y - o f f and Sec 25N f o r retrenchment lay^ 
down t h a t the employer s h a l l not l a y - o f f or r e t r e n c h ary work-
man e x c e p t w i th the p r e v i o u s p e r m i s s i o n of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
government who i s o b l i g e d t o grant or r e f u s e p e r m i s s i o n , for 
r e a s o n s t o be r e c o r d e d . I f p e r m i s s i o n or r e f u s a l i s n o t commv>. 
n i c a t e d w i t h i n two months o f the a p p l i c a t i o n t h e r e o f s h a l l be 
deemed t o be chanted. There i s no any p r o v i s i o n f o r a p p e a l or 
r e v i s i o n s . 
In c a s e where l a y - o f f and re trenchment n o t i c e a s the 
c a s e may b e , i s c o n t i n u i n g when t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s become 
e f f e c t i v e , t h e employer i s o b l i g e d t o o b t a i n p e r m i s s i o n f o r 
c o n t i n u i n g t h e l a y - o f f or t o e f f e c t re trenchment f o r which 
n o t i c e has been g i v e n . 
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l a y - o f f or re t renchment w i t h o u t permiss ion has been 
made i l l e g a l and i s a l s o v i s i t e d wi th pena l conseqxuinces 
f o r t h e employer . 
REASONS FOR GRANT CR REFUSAL OF TtC iSRMlSSIONt 
m E l e c t r o S t e e l Castings3^ a s i n g l e judge of t h e Calcu-
t t a High Cour t , held t h a t reasons fo r g ran t or r e f u s a l of 
p e r m i s s i o n for re t renchment under Sec 25N(2) must be r e l e v a n t 
t o t h e o b j e c t of t h e Act, namely t o f a c i l i t a t e i n d u s t r i a l 
harmony and t o avoid i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e , on f a c t s t h e c o u r t 
found t h a t the Government had t a k e n i n t o t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
t h e f a c t t h a t a l a rge nunber of people were involved as 
such^who were proposed t o be r e t r e n c h e d . Although, i t was 
t r u e t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r goods t h o s e were producing had 
come unreraunerat ive because of sho r t age of market y e t t h e 
Government opined t h a t t h e sh r inkage i n the market demand 
may n o t be permanent and t h e r e was p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v i v a l . 
So t h e Government r e f u s a l t o g r a n t permiss ion was u p h e l d . 
The c ^ J e c t r e l i e d on by t h e Cour t would be t h e r e i a a l l 
c a s e s and r e f u s i n g permiss ion on mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s , even 
though t h e employer hcs a c t e d b o n a f i d e , would i n t h e long 
run prove t o be coun t e r p roduc t ive and i t w i l l be push ing 
t h e employer t o t h e w a l l t i l l he i s forced t o f i n a l l y c l o s e 
down h i s b u s i n e s s . I t i s submi t t ed t h a t t h e r easons found 
by t h e c o u r t t o J u s t i f y r e f u s a l a r e r e a l l y no t j u s t i f i e d . 
At b e s t t h e government's power of s e c u r i t y could be s a i d t o 
be r e l a t e d t o bonaf ide of the employer o n l y . 
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2 
la General Industrial Society's case Andhra Pradesh 
High Court said that i f large nurrber of workmen are la id-
off i t may lead to industrial unrest and possibly a l so aff-
ect the law and order s i tuat ion . But that w i l l be so in any 
case 6f lay-off and should i t mean that an employer can 
never lay.off employees even i f t he situation i s compell-
ing unless such lay-off i s due to shortage of power or natu-
ra l calamity which has been spec i f ica l ly excluded from the 
obligation to obtain permission. That does not seem to be 
the intent ion. Here again an enquiry regarding bonafides of 
employer appears t o have been intended. Further the require-
ment of prior permission for lay-off and retrenchment mi l i -
ta tes against the very concept i t s e l f which have devdoped 
to meet the exegencies of emerging situations* even i f the 
government was to grant permission, i t is very l ikely that 
by the time permission i s coimtunicated or I t i s deemed to be 
granted the emergency i s over or the s i tuation might have 
worsened. 
It i s submitted that i t would have been appropriate 
to provide for approval of the action then for taking prior 
permission. If the legis lature i s concerned about i t . It i s 
a l l the more imperative to do so, particularly when Sec 25N 
has been held unconstitutional by a division bench of Madras 
High Court and on the same grounds Sec 25M can a l so be 
struck down. In fact similar provisions regarding x)ermission 
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for c l o s u r e have a l r eady been s t r u c k down by t h e supreme 
4 
Court* 
CONSTITUriCMAL vafcUDITY OF SECTIOtS 25 M and 25Hs 
The v a l i d i t y of Sec 25M came to be examined by t h e 
Andhra J t a d e s h High Cour t in General I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y ' s 
case and t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed were held t o be r e a s o n a b l e 
and not v i o l a t i v e of t h e employer ' s fundamental r i g h t t o 
c a r r y on b u s i n e s s ensh r ined i n A r t i c l e 19(1) (g) of t he 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , The c o u r t made a d i s t i n c t i o n betwen t h e r e s -
t r i c t i o n s imposed by Sec 25(0) on c l o s u r e and Sec 25M. In 
t h a t u n l i k e 3ec 25 (O) Sec 25M r e q u i r e d r ea sons t o be r e c o r d -
ed in w r i t i n g and t h a t permission s h a l l be deemed t o have 
been g ran ted on t h e exp i ry of the pe r iod of two months . 
These two p o i n t s of dis-tfnctions were c o n s i d e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l . 
The C o u r t ' s op in ion Sec 25(0) had been s t r u c k down by t h e 
Supreme Court for absence of such p r o v i s i o n s amongstother 
g rounds . 
The above view was, however, n o t accep ted by a d i v i s i o n 
7 
bench of Madras High Court in Ra j end ran ' s c a s e examining t h e 
v a l i d i t y of SeC 25N. Re fe r r i ng t o the judgement i n Oenefal 
p 
I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y , c o u r t s a id t h a t a mere p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r -
i n g r e a s o n t o be g iven can no t be t aken t o be s u f f i c i e n t 
sa feguard a g a i n s t a r b i t r a r y r e f u s a l u n l e s s g u i d e l i n e s a r e s e t 
o u t . I t was r i g h t l y po in t ed out t h a t even in a c a s e , where 
t h e employer makes ou t a good case for r e t r e n c h m e n t . I t i s 
99 
possible for the appropriate authority to refuse to grant 
permission by giving some reasons and as we have seen^ this 
9 
is what was done in the case of Electrosteel Castings. The 
court observed, '^'Ryere is no provision in the Ast to quest-
ion whimsical orders by filing appeals or revision.... 
The mere provision providing for reasons to be given by the 
authority can not be said to be a sufficient safeguard for 
the proper exercise of the pow«r to grant or refuse permi-
ssion..• the provision for a deemed permission on the expiry 
of the two months, period is also not a sufficient safeguard 
against arbitrary regusal to give permission? 
The two main substantial reasons ^iven by the Supreme 
court in Bxce 1 Wearj" that no guidelines were available 
from the statute and that there was no provision to set right 
an arbitrary exercise of power are present even in Ss 25 N 
12 
as well as in Sec 25M. Striking down Sec 25 N court 
observed! 
"Sec 25N s u f f e r s from a r b i t r a i n e s s and unreasonableness. 
Sec 25N or any other provis ions of the Act does not provide 
th<it g u i d e l i n e s as t o how the app l i ca t ion for permission by 
an employer for retrenchment have to be disposed of ard on 
what grounds the permission could be re fused . I t does not 
provide for any appeal or r e v i s i o n even against the a r b i t -
rary orders of r e f u s a l . The provis ion s o far as i t impose^ 
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such a r e s t r i c t i o n i s unreasonable having regard to the fact 
t h a t the employer i s forced to continue the employment of 
personnel who are found t o be surplus for his requirements 
and thus incur unnecessary expenditure in connection with 
his undertaking t o compel on employer to continue t o employ 
surplus 1 hour by refusing permission under Sec 25 N w i l l be 
an unreasonable r e s t r i c t i o n which w i l l v io la t e Art 1 9 ( l ) ( f ) 
"13 
and (g) of the Cons t i tu t ion . 
the 
For the above reasons' even sec 25M i ^ v i o l a t i o n of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . The decision of Sxcel We^ tr V Union of India 
was over-ruled in the Papnasam Labour union V Madura Coats 
l td and Jtor^^ The court held t ha t Section 25 M s a t i s f i e s 
various aspects of scrut iny for upholding reasonable r e s t r i c -
t ion on the fundamental r i ^ h t . R e s t r i c t i o n under Sect ion 25M 
requ i r ing pr ior approval of spec i f ied State Authority i s ne-
cessary in la rger public i n t e r e s t and t o p ro tec t the i n t e r e s t 
of worka«n and t o avoid the hardship t o workmen being subjec-
ted t o uncalled for lay-off . In t h i s case the decis ion of 
High Court was se t as ide by upholding the v i r e s of Section 
25M. The Supreme court held t h a t r e s t r i c t i ca i imposed under 
Section 25M(2) can not be held t o be a r b i t r a r y , unreasonable 
or far in excess of the need for which »uch r e s t r i c t i o n has 
been sought t o be imposed. Both procedural recdonableness 
and s u b s t a n t t d l reasonableness are held t o have been s a t i s f i e d 
and the Apex Court have no doubt t h a t the au thor i ty would a c t 
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promptly and see that the establishment in question i s not put 
to loss for no fault on i t s part and that the authority would 
act with speed in cases of sudden break down e t c . 
In Court's view, the reasonings indicated in Sxcel Vtear *s 
case in striking down 25(0)are not applicable for considering 
the constitutional va l id i ty of Section 25M(2). Cta the contrary, 
i t appears that reasonings indicated in Meenakshi Mills case 
in upholding the val id i ty of Section 25N squarely apply in 
upholding the vires of Section 25 Mo The res tr ic t ion appears 
necessary in larger public interest and to protect the inter-
e s t of workmen, who, but for the restr ict ion may be subjected 
to uncalled for lay-off. The application of this ras tr i c t ion 
to industrial establishments specified in section 25 K duly 
takes care of the hardship which could otherwise be caused to 
small establishments. Directive Crinciples do require placing 
of the res tr ic t ion on large industrial establishment employ-
ing large nunfeer o£ workmen. The impugned decision of the 
Madras HLgh Court, therefore, must be held to be erroneous 
and the same is# set aside by upholding the vires of Section 
25M of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was introduced 
under the Amending Act of 1976. 
IXi i^pnasam labour Union case, the following principles 
and guidelines were laid down for considering the const i tut ion-
a l i ty of a statutory provision t|pon a challenge on the al leged 
vice of unreasonableness of the res tr ic t ion Imposed by i t . 
102 
g^ \ The r e s t r i c t i o n sought t o be imposed on the fundamental 
r i g h t s guaranteed by Ar t ic le 19 of the Const i tu t ion must not 
be a r b i t r a r y or of an excessive nature so as t o go beyond 
the requirement of f e l t need of the socie ty and object sought 
t o be achieved. 
b^ There must be a d i r e c t and proximate nexus or a reason-
able connection between the r e s r r i c t i o n imposed and the 
object sought t o be achieved, 
c ) No abs t r ac t or fixed pr inc ip le can be la id down which 
may have universal app l i ca t ion in a l l c a se s . Such considera-
t i on on the question of qual i ty of reasonableness, the re fore , 
i s expected to vary from case t o ca se . 
d^ In in t e rp re t ing cons t i t u t i ona l provis ions , court should 
be a l i ve t o the f e l t need of the soci**ty and complex issues 
facing the people which the l eg i s l a tu re intends t o solve 
through e f fec t ive l e g i s l a t i o n , 
e) Di apprecia t ing such problems and f e l t need of the 
society the j u d i c i a l approach must necessar i ly be (tynamic 
pragmatic and e l a s t i c , 
f) I t i s imperative t h a t for considerat ion of reasonable-
ness of r e s t r i c t i o n imposed by a s t a t u t e , the Court should 
examine whether the s o c i a l control as envisaged in Ar t i c l e 
19 i s being effected by the r e s t r i c t i o n imposed on fundamen-
t a l r i g h t . 
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g) Although Article 19 guarantees a l l the seven freedoms 
to the c i t i zens , such guarantee does not confer any absolute 
or unconditional r ight but Is subject to reasonable r e s t r i c -
t ion which the legislature may imposed in public in te res t . 
I t i s therefore necessary to examine whether such r e s t l l c -
t ion meant to protect social welfare s a t i s ^ i n g the need of 
prevailing, social valueso 
h) The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the 
procedural and substantive aspects . I t should not be bound 
by processual periTdctousness or jurisprudence of remedies, 
1) Restrict ion imposed on the fundamental r ight guaranteed 
under Art ic le 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitxary 
unbridle , uncanalsed and excesive and also not unrea-
sonably discriminatory. Eoc- hypothesis, there fore a r e s t -
r i c t ion to be reasonable must also be consistent with Art i -
c le 14 of t he Constitution, 
j ) In judging the reasonableness of the res t r i c t ion Imp^ 
osed by Clause (6^ of the Article 19, the Court has t o bear 
in mind direct ive principles of s t a t e policy. 
K) Ordinarily, any res t r ic t ion so imposed which has the 
effect of promoting or effectuating a directive principle 
can be presumed to be a reasonable res t r i c t ion in public 
i n t e r e s t . 
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The object underlying the requirement of p r io r permi-
ssion for retrenchment of workmen introduced by Sect ion 25-N 
as indica ted in the Statement of Cbject and Reasons for the 
Amending Act of 1976 i s t o prevent avoidable hardship t o the 
employees r e s u l t i n g from retrenchment by protect ing employment 
t o those already employed and maintain higher tempo of produc-
t ion and productivi ty by preserving i n d u s t r i a l peace and har-
mony. The sa id considerat ion coupled with the bas ic idea und-
e r ly ing the provisions of the Act/ namely se t t lement of indus-
t r i a l d isputes and promotion of i n d u s t r i a l peace, gives a 
s u f f i c i e n t indicat ion of the facot rs which have t o be borne 
in mind by the appropriate government or au thor i ty by e x e r c i -
sing i t s power t o grant or refuse permission for retrenchment 
under sub-sect ion (2) . 
In Cour t ' s view, the aforesaid observat ions in upholding 
the v a l i d i t y of Sect ion 25N squarely apply in upholding the 
v a l i d i t y of Section 25M. I t i s evident t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e 
hds taken care in exempting the need for pr ior permission for 
lay off in Section 25M i f such lay off i s necess i t a t ed on 
account of power fa i lure or na tu ra l calamity because such 
reasonss being grave, sudden and e x p l i c i t , no further scru t iny 
i s ca l l ed fo r . There may be various o ther cont ingencies j u s t i -
fying an iimiediate act ion of lay off but then the l e g i s l a t u r e 
in i t s wisdom has thought i t des i r ab le in the g r e a t e r publ ic 
i n t e r e s t t t e t decis ion to lay off should not be taken by the 
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employer on i t s own assessment with immediate ef fect but the 
employer must seek approval from t h e concerned au thor i ty 
which i s reasonable expected t o be a l ive t o the prdalems asso-
c i a t ed %rLth the concenned industry and other r e levan t factors, 
so t h a t on scrut iny of the reasons pleaded for permit t ing 
lay-off, sijbch author i ty may a r t fve a t a ju s t and proper dec i -
s ion in the matter of according or refusing permission t o lay-
off. Such author i ty i s unaer an ob l iga t ion t o dispose of the 
app l i c a t i on to accord permission for a lay off expedi t iously 
and, i n any event, within a period not exceeding two months 
from t h e date of seeking permission. I t may not be unl ikely 
t h a t in some cases on employer may suffer unmerited hardship 
upto a period of two months within which his app l ica t ion for 
lay-off i s required to be disposed of by the au thor i ty conc-
erned but having undertaken a productive venture by establ is tv-
ing an i n d u s t r i a l un i t employing a large number of labour 
force^ such employer has t o face such conse<yience on some 
occasions and may have to suffer some hardship for some time 
but not exceeding two months within which his case for a lay 
off i s required t o be considered by the concerned au thor i ty 
otherwise i t w i l l be deemed t h a t permission has been accord-
ed . In t he grea ter public i n t e r e s t for maintaining i n d u s t r i a l 
peace and harmony and t o prevent unemployment without Jus t 
cause , the r e s t r i c t i o n imposed under sub-section(2)of Sec-
t i o n 25M cannot be held to be a r b i t r a r y , unreasonable or fa r 
in excess of the need for which such r e s t r i c t i o n has been 
sought t o be imposed. 
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It may be added here that it has long been an accep-
ted principle of industrial law that retrenchment, if 
bonafide, can not be interfered with even by the Labour 
courts or Industrial Tribunals. Same may be said of 
lay-off as well. But now under Ss 25 M and 25N, an 
execlusive authority has been given the power to ques-
tion the right of the employer to lay-off and retrench 
even in bona fide cases and the power is quite unguided. 
Such a wide power is highly un-justified. 
For a scrutiny of the employer's decision to lay-
off or retrench, law may be amended to provide for 
approval of such action from a labour court or Indust-
rial Tribunal so that the court may examine whether 
the employers decision was bona fide or not. 
However, judiciary is very much keen in looking 
after the interest of labour class. It can be inferred 
by various pronouncements of the courts. Some of the 
recent pronouncements are as such: 
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Baldev Singh V Labour Oourt, Chandigarh and another 
It was observed In this case that the contravention 
of Section 25 F renders the order of termination void and 
Inoperative and entitled the workmen to the relief of reln-
statemen with full back wages. If no reasons are given 
to depart from the normal rule of awarding full back wages* 
the workman Is entitled for the same. 
An industrial dispute may arise on account of failure 
on the part of employer to comply with the conditions of 
section 25 N, Both workmen and management can raise indus-
trial disputes and move the appropriate Government grant-
ing or refusing permission for retrenchment. 
State Transport Accounts Association V Orlssa State 
17 
Road Transport Oorporatlon 
It was held In this case that the respondent corpora-
tion is an industrial undertaking within the meaning of 
Section 25 L. The corporation has its workshops for repairs, 
and Hervlclng the transport buses, plants for retreading 
tyres, printing press to produce ticket books and other 
materials, such as forms and registers to be maintained 
in the offices, without these units, the transport business 
can not be carried on. The factories may be located In 
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d i f f e r e n t s t a t i o n s and zone but they c o n s t i t u t e an 
i n t eg ra t ed whole and form spec i f i c u n i t s of the corpo-
r a t i o n so as t o make i t an i n d u s t r i a l undertaking and 
t h e r e f o r e , t he orders of retrenchment without compliance 
of the mandatory provis ions of Section 25(N)are i l l e g a l . 
Workmen of Meenakshi Mil ls L td , e t c , V Meenakshi Mil ls 
18 Ltd, and another . 
The Supreme court held Section 25''N)of the Act as 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y va l i d on the ground tha t the r e s t r i c t i o n s 
Imposed on the r i g h t of employer to r e t rench workmen is 
in the i n t e r e s t of general pxiblic. I t does not in f r inge 
A r t i c l e 19( l ) (g ) of the Const i tu t ion and duty to pass a 
speaking order and affording opportunity to the p a r t i e s 
concerned i s su f f i c i en t safeguard agains t a r b i t r a r y 
;?ction. Authority is not invested with j u d i c i a l power 
while functioning under sub-clause (2) of Section 25{ N) 
and hence no appeal l i e s to Supreme C^nrt against an 
o rder passed under sub-sec t ion (2) of Section 25-^Ni. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGCSSTION 
l a y - o f f is a temporary invo lun ta ry unemployment of a 
workman brought about by the f a i l u re , re fusa l or i n a b i l i t y 
of the employer to provide him work when t h e con t r ac t of emp-
loyment becomes Impossible of performance unjer c i r e urns taiaces 
of stoppage of work, like> shortage of coa l , power or raw 
mater ia l or the accumulation of stocks, the breakdown of mach-
inery . na tu ra l calamity bygt r ike or slowing down of production 
on the par t of workmen in another par t of es tabl ishment or any 
other analogous reason caused by factors beyond «verybody's 
c o n t r o l . A lay-off comes about when there i s temporary f r u s t -
t r a t i o n of the cont rac t of employment. 
The Act does not lay down any de f in i t e period for l ay-
off and except for his ent i t lement t o lay-off compensation, 
a laid off workman has no any remedy i f the employer continues 
to put off the decision t o continue the lay-off or r e t rench the 
workmen. If the workman leaves the job he looses the bene f i t 
of retrenchment compensation and i f he continues in job he 
i s unaware of the time t i l l lay-off would cont inue . To r e l i e v e 
him of such a suspended animation and to impress upon the 
employers to take timely decision e i t h e r t o r e t rench the work-
men in case of prolonged periods of lay-off or t o l i f t i t , i t 
i s suggested tha t provision be made in t h i s regard . 
I l l 
The workman may give not ice t o the employer of h is 
i n t e n t i o n t o be t r ea t ed as retrenched and claim retrenchment 
compensation i f normal working i s not resumed a t the expiry 
of such notice keeping in view the fact t h a t Sec 25C provided 
for retrenchment a f t e r for ty f ive days of lay-off the period 
of not ice can be two weeks so t h a t in a l l a workman i s not 
languishing in uncertainty for more than two months. This 
claim of the workmen may be contested by the employer by 
a counter noticd t o the workman that he reasonably expects 
to resume normal working in another four weeks t ime. However, 
i f in fac t the work i s not so resumed the workman should be 
c3eemed t o have been retrenched and in t h a t event the lay-off 
comvjensation paid to him should not be adjusted aga ins t r e -
trenchment compensation tha t would become payable to him, 
Although in Firestone Tyre Rubber Co« Supreme Court 
observed t h a t right t o lay-off must be spec i f i ca l ly found 
in the con t rac t of employment and tha t Sec 25C does not 
recognise any eoitmon law or inherent r i g h t of the employer 
2 
to lay-off from the concept of lay-off t h a t lay-off occurs 
when there i s temporary f r u s t r a t i o n of the cont rac t of emp-
loyment, and from sec-25M prohib i t ing lay-off in c e r t a i n 
circumstances, lead t o the inference tha t general r i g h t of 
t he employer t o r e s o r t t o lay-off has been recognised by 
def in ing the circumstances under which f a i l u r e , r e fu sa l work 
3 
occurs and tha t i s lay-off . In Castophene Manufacturing Co, 
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Bombay High Court observed tha t the d e f i n i t i o n in See 2 (kkk^ 
implies the suspension of employment for reasons spec i f ied 
and t h a t i s lay-off*However, the cour t granted a c e r t i f i c a t e 
t o appeal t o the Supreme c o u r t . 
I t i s suggested t h a t the employers r i g h t t o lay-off 
be spec i f i ca l ly provided for , for in the ^ s e n c e of such a 
r i g h t the employer w i l l be l e f t with no a l t e r n a t i v e bu t t o 
r e t rench the workmen and for a workman i t i s more important 
t o r e t a i n his job and be temporarily la id off t h a t to be 
re t renched , 
secur i ty of income i s a matter of grea t moment t o a 
workman and t h i s led t o the provision for payment of compen-
sa t ion for lay-off . The provision has been made appl icab le 
only t o i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishment •raploying f i f t y or more 
workmen. In making t h i s provision the in ten t ion was to s tan-
da r i s e the compensation being paid by xome bigger e s t a b l ^ h . ' 
tnent and awarded by i n d u s t r i a l t r i b u n a l s , amongst o h t e r s , on 
cons idera t ion of s i z e and f inanc i a l v i a b i l i t y of the e s t a b -
lishment, p r io r t o the 1953 amendment. This does not r u l e out 
compensation to workmen in i n d u s t r i a l establ ishment to which 
Sec 25 C does not apply . This being a s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
must receive a l i b e r a l cons t ruct ion and h in t in t h i s d i r e c -
t ion i s ava i lab le from the observation of t h e Supreme Court 
4 in Fi res tone Tyre & Rubber Go, t h a t if an employer has a 
r i g h t t o lay-off and the i n d u s t r i a l establ ishment i s such 
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where Sec 25C does not apply. In a reference for adjudicat ion. 
Indus t r i a l Tribunal has power t o award some compensation,sugge-
s t ing t h a t Chapter V-A i s not a complete code and r i g h t l y so . 
In Hari ft-asad *3 case a f te r an examlnat on of the 
ordinary meaning of the expression, r e t r enchment , i t s de f in i t i on 
and scheme of the Act, Supreme Court down the wide impact of 
the de f in i t ion and held tha t retrenctwient means discharge of 
surplus labour. This was followed and accepted t o be the t rue 
impact of the expression, retrenchment t i l l recent ly when the 
S»:ate Bank, the Supreme Court read the d e f i n i t i o n in i so l a t i on 
and gave a wide meaning t o the expression, any reason whatsoever 
The obsevation in Hindustan St^eel' tha t there was no incons i s t -
ency between the two judgements led some High Courts t o exp-
p 
l a in the observation of S t a t e Bank" in itar f ac tua l background 
and adhere to the r u l e of surplusage while some obher hdld 
t h a t surplusage was not the sinua-non for retrenchment, in 
9 Santosh Gupta the Supreme Court explained t h a t reasons for 
surplusage for retrenchment as started in Hari flrasad was 
pnly i l l u s t r a t i v e and not exhaust ive. In Mohan l a l ^ t h e wide 
meaning of the expression was reaffirmed in the ru l ing tha t 
except for the cases excepted in the Section i t s e l f every 
termination was retrenchment. Doubt about the Correct ions of 
Santosh Gupta was expressed by Bathak J in S.K.Verma.Sven from 
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the scheme of the Act, i t appears th^t 'retrenchment • 
r e f e r r ed t o disch-^rge of surplus labour only. 
What should be the r e a l meaning of expression re t rench-
ment i s a policy matter which should be solved by the l e g i s -
l a tu re a lone , sooner the l eg i s la tu re s teps in the b e t t e r i t 
would be* 
To e f fec t a val id retrenchment, the employer i s obliged 
t o observe c e r t a i n requirements of law which are» 
i ) not ice t o workmen or payment of wages in l ieu thereof , 
iDpayment of retrenchment compensation a t the time of 
retrenchment, vand 
i i i ) o r d i n a r i l y to follow the ru le of " l a s t come f i r s t go* 
while retrenching any workman. 
Non compliance of these requ i s i t e s w i l l render an order 
of retrenchment inval id and i l l e g a l but not non-es t . I t 
would be open t o the retrenched wcrktmn e i the r t o challenge 
his retrenchment as inval id and i l l e g a l for non-compliance 
of any of the three e s s e n t i a l requirement and claim r e i n s -
tatement or t o accept the retrenchment and claim compensa-
t i on , i f not pa id . 
The ' l a s t come f i r s t go* ru l e i s appl icable only t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r category of workmen and the ru le i s not r i g i d 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . For Ju s t i f i ed reasons l ike e f f ic iency , 
g rea te r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , regular ly and behaviour etc .employer 
may r e t a i n the junior and retrench the senior workman. 
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The Law also recognised the preferential right t o r e -
trench workman to claim re-employment whenever the employer 
had occasion to employ another hand. The large establishment 
employing one hundred or more workmen have been treated 
differently from other establishments For effecting lay-pff 
or retrenchment in such establishment, permission of t h e 
authority specified by the appropriate Government has to be 
obtained. These provisions put unjustif ied res tr ic t ions upon 
the employer. The very requirement of permission defeats the 
purpose of lay-off or retrenchment to meet emergency and 
unavoidable s i tuat ion or to work out the dead weight of 
surplus labour. 
Although these provisions have been upheld by Andhra 
14 I^adesh High Court on the touch stone of the condition but 
the reasons given are not convincing to say that i f a large 
nuntoer of workmen are laid-off i t may lead to industr ial un-
rest and possibly a l so have effect on the law and order s i t u -
ation, does not make restr ict ion reasonable, Th© provisions 
have been held v io la t ive of Article 19( l ) (P) and (G) of 
the Constitution by the Madras High Court^ and i t i s f e l t 
rightly s o . 
It has long been an accepted principle of industrial 
adjudication that lay-off or retrenchment, i f bonafide,can 
not be interfered even by the industrial tribunals and t o 
give an exeautive authority the power to refuse or grant 
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permission for lay-off or retrenchment, even in bon^fide 
cases are unjustified. I t i s suggested that the employer 
may be obliged, to seek approval of his action of lay-off 
or retrenchment from industr ia l tribunals so that i f i t 
were to be found not bonafilJe, appropriate rel ief be given 
to the affected workmen. This however i s again a policy 
matter and if the legislature pay no attention to i t . 
I t concern for checking large -scale lay-offs and r e t -
renchment may not be efficacious in the event of the pro~ 
visions of Chapter VB declared to be unconstitutional even 
ty the Supreme Court, of which there are great chances 
as the provisions are both unreasonable and unguided. 
-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-
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